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THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND THE
CANADIAN BILL OF RIGHTS: REGINA V. APPLEBY

By MICHAEL MANDEL*
In Regina v. Appleby, 1 the Supreme Court of Canada was once again
seized with the question of an alleged conflict between the CanadianBill of
Rights2 and a provision of another federal statute. The impugned provision
was s. 224A(1) (a) of the Criminal Codes which to be fully understood
must be read in conjunction with s. 222:4
222. Everyone who, while his ability to drive a motor vehicle is impaired by
alcohol or a drug, drives a motor vehicle or has the care or control of a motor
vehicle, whether it is in motion or not, is guilty of an indictable offence or an
offence punishable on summary conviction ...
224A. (1) In any proceeding under section 222 or 224,
(a) where it is proved that the accused occupied the seat ordinarily occupied by
the driver of a motor vehicle, he shall be deemed to have had the care or control
of the vehicle unless he establishes that he did not enter or mount the vehicle
for the purpose of setting it in motion.
The facts of Appleby were as follows: William F. Appleby was arrested
when found seated in the driver's seat of a taxi in what was never doubted
to be an impaired condition. The information alleged that he "while his
ability to drive a motor-vehicle was impaired by alcohol or a drug did unlawfully have care and control of a motor-vehicle". Appleby testified that he
had entered the driver's seat of the taxi to use the radio to summon a wrecker,
rather than for the purpose of driving the taxi. Although this evidence raised
a reasonable doubt in the mind of Ellis, Prov. J., as to whether or not Appleby had entered the vehicle for the purpose of driving it, he nevertheless
convicted and sentenced him to pay a fine of $150.00, or in default of payment to be imprisoned for 21 days.
*Member of the 1972 Graduating Class, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University. The writer wishes to express his indebtedness to Professor Anthony Hooper
of Osgoode Hall Law School of York University for his useful comments and criticisms
during the preparation of this paper.
1 [19711 3 C.C.C. (2d) 354; 16 C.R.N.S. 35; 21 D.I.R. (3d) 325.
2S.C. 1960, c. 44; now R.S.C. 1970, Appendix III.
3 S.C. 1953-54, c. 51, as am. S.C. 1968-69, c. 38, s. 16; now R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34,
s. 237 (1) (a).
4 Now s.234.
5Itis not absolutely clear from reading the case stated by Ellis, Prov. I., whether
the reasonable doubt raised by Appleby's testimony was as to his purpose in entering
the vehicle or the presence of the general element of "care or contror'. However the
former interpretation is the more likely and it seems to have been the one adopted by
the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada.
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In so convicting notwithstanding the presence of a reasonable doubt,
the learned trial judge relied on the decision of Munro, J., in R v. McRaeG
where it was held that in order to avoid the effect of s. 224A(1) (a) it was
not sufficient for an accused to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether his
purpose in entering the vehicle in question was to drive it; rather, he had to
prove that such was not his purpose by a preponderance of the evidence or
by a balance of probabilities. Munro, J., stated the law as follows:
... since the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Tupper v. The Queen,
[1968] 1 C.C.C. 253, 63 D.L.R. (2d) 289, [1967] S.C.R. 589, and the judgment
of the British Columbia Court in R. v. McCoole (1968), 65 W.W.R. 427, it is

my opinion that it is now settled law in Canada that where a statute imposes an
onus upon an accused person to establish or to prove an essential fact, that burden
of proof is fulfilled by satisfying the obligation which rests upon the party in a
civil action to prove by a preponderance of evidence or by a balance of probabilities the allegations of which proof is required by the party so asserting.7

The reference to Tupper was a reference to the obiter remarks of Judson,

J., (in which Fauteux, Martland, Ritchie and Hall, JJ. concurred) to the
effect that the onus placed on an accused by s. 295(1)8 of the Code was

proof "on a balance of probabilities". 9 In McCoole, the British Columbia
Court of Appeal merely applied this dicta as law.
At any rate, this was the basis of the ruling of the trial judge. Appleby
appealed by way of stated case to the Supreme Court of British Columbia
where the appeal was allowed and the conviction was quashed. 10 Dohm, I.,
was of the opinion that since the statement of Judson, J., in Tupper was
obiter and since McCoole and McRae were based on that statement, none
of the three cases were binding on him. Instead he relied principally on two
decisions of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, R. v. Hartley and
McCallum (No. 1)"1 and R. v. Silk's which had held that the statutory onus
placed on an accused charged with unlawful possession of drugs for the

6 [1969] 4 C.C.C. 374; 6 C.R.N.S. 199; 68 W.W.R. 609 (B.C.).
7 [1969] 4 C.C.C. 374 at 375-6.
8 Now s. 309(1) which reads:
"Everyone who without lawful excuse, the proof of which lies upon him, has
in his possession any instrument for house-breaking, vault-breaking or safebreaking is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for
fourteen years."
9 The complete statement was as follows (S.C.R. at 593):
"Once possession of an instrument capable of being used for house-breaking
has been shown, the burden shifts to the accused to show on a balance of probabilities that there was lawful excuse for possession of the instrument at the time
and place in question".
10 [1970] 1 C.C.C. (2d) 96; 12 C.R.N.S. 124; 75 W.W.R. 670.
11 [1968] 2 C.C.C. 183; 63 W.W.R. 174.
12 [1970] 3 C.C.C. 1; 9 C.R.N.S. 277; 71 W.W.R. 481.
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purpose of trafficking under the Narcotic Control Act 3 and the Food and
Drugs Act 4 respectively, to "establish", once unlawful possession had been
proved, that his purpose was not to traffic, was an onus of "raising a reasonable doubt" as to whether or not his purpose was to traffic.
Of course, to say that an accused has an "onus of raising a reasonable
doubt" is merely to say in another way that there is an onus on the Crown
of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Either way the accused would
be entitled to be acquitted if, when all the evidence adduced by either side
is in, there is a reasonable doubt as to whether he committed the offence in
question. Thus the courts which subscribed to this interpretation of the
"reverse-onus clauses" in the Narcotic Control Act and the Food and Drugs
Act were really saying that those provisions did not in any way affect the
allocation of the "persuasive burden", - the burden of convincing the
court at the end of the day of the truth of a matter - for that was still
on the Crown.r5 What the courts in Hartley and McCallum and Silk and their
predecessors had done, in effect, was to interpret those provisions as having
the effect of shifting the "evidential burden" only. 16
The phrase "evidential burden", when used in the context of a burden
on the Crown, is generally meant to describe the Crown's familiar burden of
bringing forth enough evidence to make out a prima facie case of guilt. How
much evidence the Crown must bring forward in order to discharge this burden is a matter that does not admit of a very precise formulation; but this
much at least can be said: the Crown must adduce enough evidence so that
a properly instructed jury, acting reasonably, might convict the accused, i.e.
might find that each element of the offence had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.17 If the Crown fails to discharge this burden, the accused is entitled to succeed on a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, sometimes

13 S.C. 1960-61, c. 35 (now R.S.C. 1970 c. N-1) s. 8 which provides:
"8. In any prosecution for a violation of subsection 4(2) [possession for the
purpose of trafficking], if the accused does not plead guilty, the trial shall proceed as if it were a prosecution for an offence under section 3 [simple possession],
and after the accused has had an opportunity to make full answer and defence,
the court shall make a finding as to whether or not the accused was in possession
of the narcotic contrary to section 3; if the court finds that the accused was not
in possession of the narcotic contrary to section 3, he shall be acquitted but if the
court finds that the accused was in possession of the narcotic contrary to section
3, he shall be given an opportunity of establishing that he was not in possession
of the narcotic for the purpose of trafficking, and thereafter the prosecutor shall
be given an opportunity of adducing evidence to establish that the accused was
in possession of the narcotic for the purpose of trafficking; if the accused establishes that he was not in possession of the narcotic for the purpose of trafficking,
he shall be acquitted of the offence as charged but he shall be convicted of an
offence under section 3 and sentenced accordingly; and if the accused fails to
establish that he was not in possession of the narcotic for the purpose of trafficking, he shall be convicted of the offence as charged and sentenced accordingly."
14 S.C. 1952-53, c. 38, s. 33 (now R.S.C. 1970, c. F-27 s. 35), enacted S.C. 196061, c. 37, s. 1 which provides:
"33(1) In any prosecution for a violation of subsection (2), of section 33
[possession for the purpose of trafficking], if the accused does not plead guilty,

19721

Presumption of Innocence

453

the trial shall proceed as if the issue to be tried is whether the accused was in
possession of a controlled drug.
(2) If, pursuant to subsection (1) the court finds that the accused was not
in possession of a controlled drug, he shall be acquitted, but if the court finds
that the accused was in possesion of a controlled drug, he shall be given an
opportunity of establishing
(a) that he acquired the controlled drug from a person authorized under the
regulations to sell or deal with controlled drugs; or
(b) that he was not in possession of the controlled drug for the purpose of
trafficking, and thereafter the prosecutor shall be given an opportunity of
adducing evidence to the contrary.
(3) If the accused establishes the facts set forth in paragraph (a) or (b)
of subsection (2) he shall be acquitted of the offence as charged; and if the accused fails to so establish he shall be convicted of the offence as charged and
sentenced accordingly. [ss. (2) and (3) later rep. & sub. 1968-69, c. 41, s. 8].
151 am adopting here the shorthand phrases: (1) "persuasive burden", and (2)
"evidential burden", to refer respectively to what have variously been called: (1) "the
burden of persuasion", "the risk of non-persuasion of the jury", "the major burden" and
"the primary burden"; and (2) "the burden of adducing evidence", "the burden of
going forward", "the minor burden" and "the secondary burden". In this regard I
follow Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part, 2nd ed. (1961), 871-882.
For a good examination of these two aspects of "burden of proof' in Canadian law, see
W. H. Jarvis, Primary and Secondary Burdens of Proof in Criminal Law (1963),
5 Crim. L.Q. 425.
16See especially R. v. Sharpe, [1961] O.W.N. 261; 131 C.C.C. 75; 35 C.R. 375
(CA.), where it was said concerning ss. 4(4) and 17 of the Opium and Narcotic Drug
Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 201 (re-enacted 1953-54, c. 38, ss. 3 and 8), the former section
being substantially the same as s. 8 of the Narcotic Control Act quoted supra, note 13
and the latter section providing a presumption of possession from occupation of a place
where a drug had been found (per Morden, J.A., at 377 C.R.):
'The burden resting upon the Crown in a criminal case of proving the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt is a matter of substantive law and never
shifts from the Crown. In contrast to this, the secondary burden - that of adducing evidence - may shift in the course of a trial depending upon the evidence
adduced ...
The statutory burdens or presumptions raised by s. 4(4) and s. 17 of the
Opium and Narcotic Drug Act assist the prosecution by shifting the secondary
burden, the burden of adducing evidence, to the accused after evidence is adduced by the prosecution of the basic facts which raise the presumption under
s. 17 and a finding of possession is made under s. 4(4) ... After all the evidence
has been heard, if in the mind of the court a reasonable doubt of guilt exists, the
accused must be acquitted."
17
See R. v. Haughey, [1972] 1 W.W.R. 60 (B.C.Co. Ct.) and cases therein; also
R. v. Robichaud (1950), 98 C.C.C. 86 (N.B.C.A.). Lord Parker, CJ., has stated the
proper considerations on a submission of "no case" to be the following (Practice Direction, [1962] 1 W.LR. 227):
"A submission that there is no case to answer may properly be made and
upheld; (a) when there has been no evidence to prove an essential element in the
alleged offence; (b) when the evidence adduced by the prosecution has been so
discredited as a result of cross-examination or is so manifestly unreliable that
no reasonable tribunal could safely convict upon it.
Apart from these two situations a tribunal should not in general be called
upon to reach a decision as to conviction or acquittal until the whole of the evidence which either side wishes to tender has been placed before it. If however a
submission is made that there is no case to answer, the decision should depend
not so much on whether the adjudicating tribunal (if compelled to do so) would
at that stage convict or acquit but on whether the evidence is such that a reasonable tribunal might convict. If a reasonable tribunal might convict on the evidence so far laid before it, there is a case to answer.
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called a motion for a "non-suit".1 The obvious rationale for this mechanism
is that when we say that the Crown has failed to make out a prima facie case,
i.e. failed to discharge its evidential burden, we are really saying that no jury,
if it were acting legally and reasonably, would convict the accused. Thus, in
such a situation we do not take the chance of leaving the issue of guilt or
innocence to the jury; or where there is no jury, we do not trouble the accused for an answer (the English say he has "no case to answer". Rather, we
acquit forthwith.
By the common law, the Crown has an evidential burden to discharge
with respect to each essential ingredient or element of the offence charged,
save for certain "negative averments" which can be said to be "peculiarly
within the knowledge of the accused." 19 As to these "negative averments"
and as to "defences", the evidential burden is on the accused. As to these
matters, he too has a burden of making out a prima facie case of sorts
(though it is rarely spoken of in this manner). For instance, to discharge his
evidential burden with respect to any defence, the accused must adduce
enough evidence so that a properly instructed jury, acting reasonably, might
find in his favour, i.e. might be left with a reasonable doubt as to whether or
not he had the defence. 20 The practical effect of a failure by the accused to
discharge any evidential burden that he bears with respect to an issue, is that
the issue will not be left with the jury, i.e. the judge will give no instruction
on it. In effect, the issue is thus foreclosed against him. Of course, if the
accused is successful in discharging his evidential burden with respect to any
defence (save for the defence of insanity, with which we shall deal later),
the issue must go to the jury and it becomes the Crown's
duty to disprove the
21
presence of the defence beyond a reasonable doubt.
It will be seen, then, that whether we are speaking of the Crown's or
the accused's evidential burden, we are essentially speaking of a matter of
jury control.22 In order to get past the judge to the jury, the party with the
18 Of course, if the Crown succeeds in making out a prima facie case, the factfinder is authorized but not required to convict, even in the absence of any evidence
from the accused's side. In the words of Ritchie, J., in Sunbeam Corporation (Canada)
Ltd. v. The Queen, [19691 S.C.R. 221 at 228:
"I do not think that any authority is needed for the proposition that, when
the Crown has proved a prima fade case and no evidence is given on behalf of
the accused, the jury may convict, but I know of no authority to the effect that
the trier of fact, is required to convict under such circumstances."
1
0These are dealt with infra, notes 148 to 159.
2
0o
See Mancini v. D.P.P., [1942] A.C. 1; R. v. Lobell, [1957] 1 Q.B. 547 (C.CA.).
The usual thing that is said is that the accused must adduce "some evidence" or "some
credible evidence". Of course, the evidence need not come from the accused himself;
it may come from direct or cross examination of the Crown's witnsses or the accused's
witnesses.
2
1See Latour v. The King, [1951] S.C.R. 19.
22 Of course where the judge is sitting alone, though the test of what constitutes a
prima facie case is the same as where there is a jury, it is somewhat awkward to speak
of a judge controlling the reasonableness of his own decision (although control may be
exercised by appellate review; thus we may speak generally of "factfinder" control).
Where the judge is sitting alone the more important rationale of the directed verdict
is the "anti-harassment" rationale, viz. that nobody should be troubled to answer a
criminal charge unless there is a "case" against him.
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evidential burden on an issue must adduce enough evidence so that a decision
in his favour on the issue might reasonably be found. This is the first "hurdle".
The second hurdle is, of course, to obtain a favourable decision on the issue
at the end of the case as a matter of "persuasion". 23
When looked at in this context, decisions such as those in Hartley and
McCallum and Silk become somewhat difficult to understand. Take, for
example, a charge of possession of a controlled drug for the purpose of
trafficking as was the case in Silk. The statute provides that when possession
is proved, the accused shall be convicted of possession for the purpose of
trafficking unless he "establishes" that such was not his purpose. 24 The Court
holds, though, that "establishes" means "raises a reasonable doubt" and thus
the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's purpose
was to traffic. This, of course, would have been the Crown's duty without
the presence of such a provision. However, adds the Court, the evidential
burden is shifted to the accused. Yet it is never suggested that if he fails to
discharge this burden the issue will be foreclosed against him, as it would be,
for example, if he failed to adduce any evidence on a plea of self-defence.
On the contrary, it is held that at the end of the case, if the Crown has not
proved the whole offence, i.e. "possession" and "purpose" beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted. This would also be the
situation if the provision was not present. What, then, were the courts saying
was the effect of this provision? They said simply, that it relieved the Crown
of making out the traditional prima facie case on the issue of "purpose", protecting it from a directed verdict of acquittal and ensuring that once possession was proved, the case would go to the jury.25 However, though the Crown
is relieved to this extent of its evidential burden, that burden is not strictly
shifted to the accused, except in the sense that as in any other case where
the Crown has made out a prima facie case which must go to the factfinder,
23

See Cross, Evidence 3rd ed. (1967) at 69.

In Jayasena v. The Queen, [1970] A.C. 618, the Privy Council distinguished the
"evidential burden" from the burden of proof proper (what we have called the "persuasive burden") and described the nature of the former burden as follows (per Lord
Devlin at 624):
"Their Lordships do not understand what is meant by the phrase 'evidential
burden of proof.' They understand, of course, that in trial by jury a party may
be required to adduce some evidence in support of his case, whether on the
general issue or on a particular issue, before that issue is left to the jury. How
much evidence has to be adduced depends upon the nature of the requirement. It
may be such evidence as, if believed and if left uncontradicted and unexplained,
could be accepted by the jury as proof. Or it may be, as in English law when
on a charge of murder the issue of provocation arises, enough evidence to suggest
a reasonable possibility. It is doubtless permissible to describe the requirement
as a burden and it may be convenient to call it an evidential burden. But it is confusing to call it a burden of proof, whether described as legal or evidential or
by any other adjective when it can be discharged by the production of evidence
that falls short of proof."
24 The Food and Drugs Act, s. 33, supra, note 14.
25 "The section, once possession has been found, simply relieves the Crown of the
onus of adducing evidence to prove that the accused had possession for the purpose of
trafficking and to that extent the section softens the burden which otherwise rests upon
the Crown.": per Branca, J.A., in Silk, [1970] 3 C.C.C. 1 at 22.
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it may be tactically to the advantage of the accused to adduce some countervailing evidence. 26 But, of course, he is strictly entitled to rely on any deficiencies in the Crown's case.2 7
The strangest aspect of this interpretation, however, is that if the Crown,
through its evidence and apart from any assistance provided by the statute,
has not made out a traditional prima facie case on the issue of "purpose",
then by definition no properly instructed factfinder, acting reasonably, would
convict. Yet this would be the only occasion where the statutory provision
would be of any use to the Crown, for if there was a prima facie case on the
evidence, that alone would get the question to the factfinder apart from any
statutory provision. Thus for the provision, as interpreted, to have any effect
whatsoever, the factfinder would have to act unreasonably, i.e. illegally.28
This very curious line of statutory interpretation appears to have been based
on the English case of R. v. Ward2 9 which was later repudiated in R. v.
Patterson.0
This rather long digression, which will be useful later when we come to
consider the effect of the Canadian Bill of Rights, on statutory provisions
such as this, leads us back to the decision of Dohm, J., in Appleby. Following the line of interpretation we have just examined, he expressed his opinion
thus:
In my respectful view the degree or standard of proof to rebut a statutory presumption in a criminal case is not that the defence has to prove the same on
26 See Cross, supra, note 23 at 73-74.
In Silk, Nemetz, J.A., quoted the following statement from Glanvile Williams,
Proof of Guilt 3rd ed. (1963) at 185-6 as stating the effect of the provision being considered ([1970] 3 C.C.C. 1 at 29):
"Where the law shifts the evidential burden to the accused, the prosecution need
not give any evidence, or need give only slight evidence, on that issue, in the sense
that they are not liable on that issue to be met with a submission of "no case to
answer," even though they have failed to give the evidence usually required. This
means that the accused must, for his own safety, make some answer. But the
shifting of the evidential burden does not necessarily mean that the burden of
persuasion or burden of proof proper passes to the defendant. When all the evidence is in, the jury will be directed that the burden of proving all the issues
remains with the Crown, so that if they are not satisfied on any of the issues
they must find for the defendant. All that the shifting of the evidential burden
does at the final stage of the case is to allow the jury to take into account the
silence of the accused or the absence of satisfactory explanation appearing from
his evidence."
27-... if the prisoner by argument or evidence or cross-examination of the
Crown's witnesses establishes a reasonable doubt as to whether he had possession of
the narcotic for the purpose of trafficking, he must be acquitted of that particular
offence, ... " (emphasis added): Hartley and McCallum, [1968] 2 C.C.C. 183 at 187
(per Davey, CJ.B.C.).
28A useful discussion of these cases is found in Levy, Reverse Onus Clauses in
Canadian Criminal Law - An Overview (1970), 35 Sask. L. Rev. 40, at 47-50.
29 [1915] 3 K.B. 696; 11 Cr. App. R. 245 (CA.).
80 [1962] 2 Q.B. 429; 46 Cr. App. R. 106 (C.A.).
See as to the effect of Ward in Canada, Schultz, The Statutory Onus of Proof in
Criminal Cases (1967), Can. Bar. J. 492, cited with approval in R. v. McRae (1969), 6
C.R.N.S. 199 at 201. At p. 501 of his article, Mr. Justice Schultz writes: "Courts in
Canada have been misled by Ward. But Ward is dead! It is time, in Canada, the death
is recognized and the body buried."
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a balance of probabilities, but the defence need only raise the lesser standard
of a reasonable doubt.31

An appeal by the Crown to the British Columbia Court of Appeal was
dismissed 32 and the Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. There
the full court in two separate opinions unanimously allowed the appeal and
restored the conviction entered at trial.
Ritchie, J., speaking for himself, Fauteux, C.J.C., Abbott, Martland,
Judson, Spence and Pigeon, JJ., held that there was no difference between
the words "establishes" and "proves" when used in the context of imposing
a burden on an accused 33 and that when a statute declared that it was for
the accused to do either of these, then the accused could only do it with
proof "by a preponderance of evidence or by a balance of probabilities and
... it is not enough for an accused merely to raise a reasonable doubt". 34
Further, Ritchie, J., adopted the passage we have already quoted from the
McRae3 5 case as "an accurate statement of the law", 36 recognizing that much
of the contrary opinion had been based on the repudiated Ward case 37 and
also that the "reasonable doubt" construction contended for "makes the
statutory presumption ineffective and the section meaningless". 38 In his
separate opinion, Laskin, J., (Hall, J., concurring) agreed that the construction placed by Ritchie, J., on s. 224A(1) (a) was the correct one, though he
went no further than that on this aspect of the appeal. 39
For the reasons given above with respect to the interpretations given by
the British Columbia Court of Appeal to the presumptions under the Narcotic
Control Act and the Food and Drugs Act, it is submitted that this aspect of
the Court's decision is unimpeachable.
However, there was another argument advanced on behalf of Appleby
in the Supreme Court of Canada, one that had not been argued in any of
the courts below, namely that the interpretation ultimately given s. 224A(1)
(a) conflicted with s. 2(f) of the CanadianBill of Rights (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "the Bill"). This argument, too, was unanimously rejected
by the Court and it is with this aspect of the decision that the present writer
takes issue.
It will do well here to hearken back to the words of Ritchie, J., speaking for the majority of the Court in the landmark decision of The Queen v.
3175 W.W.R. 670 at 672.
32 [19711 2 C.C.C. (2d) 98; 13 C.R.N.S. 171; [1971] 2 W.W.R. 219.
83 [19711 3 C.C.C. (2d) 354 at 357.

34
Id., at 360. The decisions relied on were basically those dealing with the burden
of proof on an accused pleading insanity as a defence: Clark v. The King (1921), 61
S.C.R. 608; Smythe v. The King, [1941] S.C.R. 17.
3
5Supra, note 7.
36 [19711 3 C.C.C. (2d) 354 at 359.
3
71d., at 359.
38
Id., at 360.
391d., at 364. It should be noted that Laskin and Hall JJ., concurred only "in
result".

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL.. 10, No. 2

Drybones ° where a provision of the Indian Act4 ' was declared inoperative
as abrogating "the right of the individual to equality before the law and the
protection of the law". 42 Concerning the effect of s. 2 of the Bill of Rights,
Ritchie, J., said:
It seems to me that a more realistic meaning must be given to the words in
question and they afford, in my view, the clearest indication that s.2 is intended
to mean and does mean that if a law of Canada cannot be "sensibly construed
and applied" so that it does not abrogate, abridge or infringe one of the rights
and freedoms recognized and declared by the Bill, then such law is inoperative
"unless it is expressly declared by an Act of the Parliament
of Canada that it
43
shall operate notwithstanding the CanadianBill of Rights".

Section 2(f) of the Bill of Rights provides as follows:
2. Every law of Canada shall, unless it is expressly declared by an Act of
the Parliament of Canada that it shall operate notwithstanding the CanadianBill
of Rights be so construed and applied as not to abrogate, abridge or infringe or
to authorize the abrogation, abridgment or infringement of any of the rights or
freedoms herein recognized and declared, and in particular, no law of Canada
shall be construed or applied so as to

(f) deprive a person charged with a criminal offence of the right to be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a fair and public
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, or of the right to reasonable
bail without just cause; ...

What counsel for Appleby argued was that any interpretation of s.
224A(1) (a) of the Code which imposed a greater persuasive burden4 on

an accused than that of raising a reasonable doubt deprived him of "the right
to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law" and that, consequently, according to the rule in Drybones the section had to be interpreted
as imposing no greater burden than that. Since in support of this argument
counsel for Appleby did "little more" than invoke the opinions of Tysoe and
Nemetz, J.A., in the Silk case 45 concerning the effect of the same section of
the Bill on s. 33 of the Food and Drugs Act,46 it will serve us well to refer
back to that case once more.
Although the main ground in Silk for holding that s. 33 (2) (b) of the
Food and Drugs Act, which required an accused charged with possession of
a controlled drug for the purpose of trafficking to "establish", once possession
had been proved, that his purpose was not to traffic, imposed no greater
burden than that of "raising a reasonable doubt" was the curious exercise in
statutory interpretation earlier discussed,47 Tysoe, J.A. (Davey, CJ.B.C.,
and Branca, S.A., concurring; Bull, S.A. expressing no opinion on this aspect
40 [1970] 3 C.C.C. 355; 9 D.L.R. (3d) 473; [1970] S.C.R. 282.
41 R.S.C. 1952, c. 149, s. 94(b); now R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, s. 95(b).
42
43

The CanadianBill of Rights, supra, note 2, s. 1 (b).
[1970] S.C.R. 282 at 294.

44
There is no express or implied reference to the "evidential burden", either in
the respondent's factum or in the opinion of Ritchie, J., though it is referred to in the

opinion of Laskin, J., infra, note 121.
45 [1971] 3 C.C.C. (2d) 354 at 362; see also respondents factum pp. 5-7.
40 The section is quoted supra, note 14.
47
Supra, text accompanying notes 11 to 30.
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of the appeal) found "support" for his view in s. 2(f) of the Canadian Bill
&4 He felt that
of Rights.
to interpret the reverse onus clause as imposing a
burden on an accused of proof on a balance of probabilities that he did not
intend to traffic in the drugs he possessed "would make a mockery of the
presumption of innocence '49 and he reasoned as follows:
The presumption of innocence that is made in criminal cases really does no
more than give the benefit of any reasonable doubt to the accused, but it is an
important feature of our law and it is so cogent that it cannot be repelled by
any evidence short of what is sufficient to establish the fact of criminality with
moral certainty. See Roscoe, Criminal Evidence, 16th ed., p. 20.
If Parliament has imposed on an accused the onus of establishing by placing
beyond dispute or by a preponderance of evidence or on a balance of probabilities
that he has not had possession for the purpose of trafficking, it has deprived him
of the benefit of a reasonable doubt as to the purpose of his possession, and it
has in effect imposed upon him the burden of disproving a positive averment of
an integral part of the offence charged against him. It is difficult for me to
believe that Parliament intended to do this. Had Parliament said that one accused
of this particular offence or, for that matter, any other offence, has the onus of
proving he is not guilty, I venture to think that no one would disagree with the
proposition that it had deprived the accused of the right to be presumed innocent
until proved guilty according to law. It is my view that the same result follows
if Parliament imposes on an accused the burden of disproving a positive averment
of an important integral part of the offence of having possession for the purpose
of trafficking.
Section 2 of the CanadianBill of Rights says that the Food and Drugs Act
shall not be construed or applied so as to deprive a person charged with an
offence thereunder of the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. The spirit and intent of s. 2(f) is such that in my opinion s. 33
of the Food and Drugs Act must not be construed or applied so as to require
the respondent to prove that he did not have possession for the purpose of trafficking. Section 33 can be given effect to if it is interpreted to mean that there
is an onus on the respondent to raise a reasonable doubt as to the purpose of
his possession and that the Crown carries the usual burden of proof of the respondent's guilt - possession and purpose - beyond a reasonable doubt. I so
interpret it.5o

The emphasis by Tysoe, J.A., on the fact that "purpose" was "a positive
averment of an integral part of the offence charged against him", was princi-

pally a way of distinguishing the Tupper case, where the matter which the
accused was charged with "proving" had been expressed negatively in the
section defining the offence,51 and thereby avoiding the effect of the dicta
of Judson, J., to which we referred earlier.5 2 It was also a way of circumvent48It might be interesting to note that the opinions in Silk were delivered on November 19, 1969, one day before the opinions of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Drybones were delivered.
49 [1970] 3 C.C.C. 1 at 13.

5OId., at 13-14.
51s. 295(1) (now 309(1)) of the Criminal Code quoted supra, note 8. "Negative
averments" are dealt with infra, notes 148 to 159.
52 Supra, note 9.
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ing the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Guertin5 3 where
it was held that on a charge under s. 80 of the Criminal Code 4 it was for the
accused to proves "lawful excuse" as a "defence" and that this didn't deprive him of his "right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according
to law", the implication being that "according to law" in s. 2(f) of the
CanadianBill of Rights meant "according to whatever Parliament enacts from
time to time as law". It was with a discussion of Guertin that Tysoe, J.A.,
concluded his reasoning in Silk:
On this aspect of the case the Crown relied on R. v. Guertin, 130 C.C.C.
403, [1961] O.W.N. 134, 34 C.R. 345. I do not regard that case as comparable
to the case before this Court. It was concerned with the provisions of Code, s. 80
which deals with possession or the making of explosives without lawful excuse,
the proof of which lies upon the accused. Stress was laid by Porter, CJ.O., on
the expression "according to law" in s. 2(f) of the Canadian Bill of Rights. I
wish to say only, and I do so with great respect, that if a statute were to declare
that a person charged with an offence shall be deemed to be guilty unless he
proves his innocence and he fails to prove it, I doubt if it could properly be
said that he has been "proved guilty according to law". The key word is "proved".
It is one thing to impose an onus on an accused to disprove a negative averment and quite another to require him to disprove a positive averment of an
integral part of an offence. Clearly, when Parliament enacted s. 2(f) of the
Canadian Bill of Rights, it intended to assure that so fundamental and wellestablished a principle of our law as to the presumption of innocence should be
preserved. In my opinion the section provides protection against the possibility
of the enactment of a statute declaring that a person shall be deemed guilty of a
criminal offence unless he establishes his innocence. I think it also has reference
and application to a statute which purports to require an accused to disprove
by a preponderance of evidence or on a balance of probabilities a positive averment of an integral part of the offence charged against him, and I so interpret
the section.50

In relying, then, on the reasoning of Tysoe, J.A., in Silk, counsel for Appleby was saying to the Supreme Court of Canada that since "care and control"
was an essential element of the offence with which Appleby was charged, it
was a violation of the presumption of innocence to "deem" it proved on the
proof of certain facts which would not of themselves (i.e. without the assistance of s. 224A(1) (a)) necessarily amount in law to "care and control", and
[1961] O.W.N. 134; 130 C.C.C. 403; 34 C.R. 345.
54 S. 80 provides:
"Every one who without lawful excuse, the proof of which lies upon him,
(a) makes or has in his possession or under his care or control an explosive
substance that he does not make or does not have in his possession or under
his care or control for a lawful purpose, or
(b) has in his possession a bomb, grenade or other explosive weapon, is
guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for five years."
S5 It is not clear from his reasons whether or not Porter, CJ.O., interpreted the
onus of "proof" in s. 80 as meaning proof on a balance of probabilities or merely the
raising of a reasonable doubt. The former is more likely and, at any rate, after Tupper,
McCoole, and Appleby, it is clearly the proper interpretation.
50 [1970] 3 C.C.C. 1 at 14-15.
53
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to require the accused, in order that he might avoid this "deeming", to
disprove, on a balance of probabilities, an intention to drive. 51
There was a separate concurring opinion rendered on the CanadianBill
of Rights issue in the Silk case by Nemetz, LA. Its importance derives from
the fact that it provided the core of the ratio of the opinion of Ritchie, J., in
Appleby, Nemetz, J.A., expressed his view of s. 2(f) thus:
There is no doubt, in my mind, that the Bill of Rights in s. 2(f) gives express
statutory aproval to Lord Sankey's memorable words in Woolmington v. Director
of Public Prosecutions, [1935] A.C. 462. The golden thread, as he described it,
which runs through the web of English criminal law was clearly identified by
Chief Justice Martin in Lee Fong Shee [60 C.C.C. 73; 47 B.C.R. 205, [1933]
3 W.W.R. 204] and by Chief Justice Davey in R. v. Hartley and McCallum
(No. 1), [1968] 2 C.C.C. 183, 63 W.W.R. 174. In my respectful view, s. 2(f) does

nothing more than restate the common law by providing that the primordial
burden of proving
the guilt of an accused beyond a reasonable doubt is always on
58
the Crown.

It was this passage that Ritchie, J., seized upon in Appleby. His sole
reason (and thus the sole reason of seven members of the Court) for rejecting the contention of the respondent concerning the effect of s.2(f) of the
Canadian Bill of Rights on the presumption in s. 224A(1) (a) of the Code
was this: if the former provision was to be taken as having codified what
Viscount Sankey, L.C., said in Woolmington, then a provision which threw
the burden of disproof of an element of an offence on the accused would not

conflict with the Bill -

because Viscount Sankey, L.C., expressed the reason-

57
There is somewhat of a difficulty involved in the meaning given by Ritchie, J.,
to the combined effect of ss. 222 and 224A(1) (a). At [1971] 3 C.C.C. (2d) 354 at

364 he says:

"In giving effect to the statutory presumption created by s. 224A(1) (a) in
relation to a charge under s. 222, the position is that if it is proved that the accused was impaired by alcohol or a drug, and it is further proved that he was,
at the relevant time, occupying the seat ordinarily occupied, by the driver, he

shall be deemed to have had the care or control of the vehicle, but the accused
has the opportunity of rebutting this presumption if he 'establishes' by the balance
of probabilities 'that he did not enter or mount the vehicle for the purpose of
setting it in motion'.
If the accused cannot so satisfy the court then the statutory presumption prevails and he is guilty of an offence under s. 222, but, if he is able to provide the
requisite evidence, he must be acquitted." (Emphasis added)
What Ritchie, J., seems to be saying then, is that an intention to drive is an essential element of the offence, for if the accused disproves it he is entitled to be acquitted.
Another way of stating this would be to say that proof of a lack of intention to drive

is a defence to the charge. This should be contrasted with R. v. Donald, [1971] W.W.R.
538; 14 C.R.N.S. 17 (B.C.C.A.) where it was held that notwithstanding clear proof of
a lack of intention to drive by the accused, he could still be convicted of the offence
because neither was intention to drive an essential ingredient of the offence nor was lack
thereof a defence. Section 224A(1) (a) was there characterized as a procedural "assist"
to the Crown in proving "care and control". If the Crown could prove it some other
way it was entitled, at its option, to do so. Donald was cited in the Court of Appeal in
Appleby (1970), 13 C.R.N.S. 171 at 176 but it is not mentioned in the reasons for
judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada.
58 [1970] 3 C.C.C. 1 at 29.
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able doubt rule he enunciated in Woolmington as being subject to any statutory exception. To quote Ritchie, J.:
If s. 2(f) of the CanadianBill of Rights is to be taken as giving statutory
approval to what Viscount Sankey, LC., said in the Woolmington case, it seems
to me to be proper to quote the whole of the sentence to which Nemetz, L.A.,
refers. What Viscount Sankey, L.C., actually said [at p. 481], after having dealt
with the defence of insanity was:
Throughout the web of English Criminal Law one golden thread is always
to be seen; that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner's
guilt subject to what I have already said as to the defence of insanity and
subject also to any statutory exception. 5 9

The emphasis is that of Ritchie, J. Further on in his opinion, Ritchie, J.,
said:
It seems to me, therefore, that if the Woolmington case is to be accepted, the
words "presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law" as they appear in
s.2(f) of the Canadian Bill of Rights, must be taken to envisage a law which
recognizes the existence of statutory exceptions reversing the onus of proof with
respect to one or more ingredients of an offence in cases where certain specific
facts have been proved by the Crown in relation to such ingredients.60

As this was the sum and substance of the reasons given by Ritchie, J.,
for deciding against the contention advanced on behalf of Appleby, the proposition that begs to be tested is whether or not it can be said that Parliament,
in enacting s. 2(f) of the CanadianBill of Rights, intended no more than a
codification of those "memorable words" which Viscount Sankey, L.C., spoke
in Woolmington.

The facts of Woolmington were as follows. The accused was charged
with murdering his wife. He testified that she was indeed killed by a rifle
which he was handling at the time, but that it had happened quite by accident.
The trial judge's charge to the jury contained the following sentence:
Once it is shown to a jury that somebody died through the act of another, that is
presumed to be murder, unless the person who has been guilty of the act which
causes the death can satisfy a jury that what happened was something less,
something which might be alleviated, something which might be reduced to a
charge of manslaughter, or was something which was accidental, or was something which could be justified. 61

He had also instructed them:
... if the Crown satisfied you that this woman died at the prisoner's hands then
he has to show that there are circumstances to be found in the evidence which
has been given from the witness-box in this case which alleviate the crime so
that it is only manslaughter or which excuse the homicide altogether by showing
it was a pure accident.6 2

The jury convicted Woolmington of murder and the Court of Criminal
Appeal affirmed. The House of Lords, however, quashed the conviction on
the ground of misdirection. Speaking for the House, Viscount Sankey, L.C.,
59 [1971] C.C.C. (2d) 354 at 363.
o Id., at 363-4.
01 Quoted in Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] A.C. 462
472-73.
02 Id., at 482.
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while admitting that there was "apparent authority for the law as laid down
by the learned judge",63 said that the direction given was nevertheless "not
the law of England". 64 After distinguishing the defence of insanity as "quite
exceptional", m the Lord Chancellor made the statement from which Ritchie,
J., quoted in Appleby. 66 As a whole, it read as follows:
Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law one golden thread is always
to be seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner's guilt
subject to what I have already said as to the defence of insanity and subject also
to any statutory exception. If, at the end of and on the whole of the case, there
is a reasonable doubt, created by the evidence given by either the prosecution or
the prisoner, as to whether the prisoner killed the deceased with a malicious
intention, the prosecution has not made out the case and the prisoner is entitled
to an acquittal. No matter what the charge or where the trial, the principle that
law
the prosecution must prove the guilt of the prisoner is part of the common
7
(emphasis
of England and no attempt to whittle it down can be entertained.
added)

Since Viscount Sankey, L.C., was thus concerned only with an interpretation6" and application of the common law, then (if we are to be strict) the
part about "any statutory exception" was pure obiter and forms no part of
the "rule" in Woolmington. For "the common law is quite a separate thing
from the law as enacted in statutes by Parliament from time to time. The
distinction is elemental, but if authority be needed, one might refer to the
words of Sir Matthew Hale who wrote of the lex scripta and the lex non
scripta. The former was comprised of "statutes or acts of parliament, which
in their original formulation are reduced into writing, and are so preserved in
their original style and words wherein they were first made". But it was the
latter which was "the common law properly so called". It was made up of
laws which
...are grown into use, and have acquired their binding power and the force of
usage, and by the strength of custom and receplaws by a long and immemorial
tion in this kingdom. 69

So even if Parliament is to be taken to have codified the rule in Woolmington
by s. 2(f) of the Canadian Bill of Rights, since the rule in Woolmington is
merely a statement of the common law with respect to the burden of proof in
criminal cases, which was and is that an accused must be acquitted if there is
a reasonable doubt as to his guilt, then s. 224A(1) (a) of the Code con63 d., at 473.

64Id., at 482.
65Id., at 475: "McNaughton's case [(1843) 4 St. Tr. (N.S.) 847] stands by itself.
It is the famous pronouncement on the law bearing on the question of insanity in cases
of murder. It is quite exceptional and has nothing to do with the present circumstances.
In McNaughton's case the onus is definitely and exceptionally placed upon the accused
to establish such a defence."
66
Supra, note 59.
67 [1935] A.C. 462 at 481-2.
68 Perhaps a more apt word than "interpretation" is "creation", for as the Privy
Council has recently noted in Jayasena, supra, note 23, the decision of the House of
Lords in Woolmington actually marked a change in the common law with respect to
the question before it. This, added the Privy Council, was quite within the spirit of the
"malleable" common law: [1970] A.C. 618 at 625.
69 Hale, A History of the Common Law 4th ed. (1792), 23. See also I Blackstone,
Commentaries, 63.
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fficts with s. 2(f) of the Bill. This is because it provides for conviction on a
charge under s. 222 even though an essential ingredient ("care or control")
may not have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 70
But perhaps we are being a little too technical. After all, it was not the
rule in Woolmington that Ritchie, J., assumed was codified in s. 2(f)
but rather what Viscount Sankey, L.C., said. And what he said was
definitely that the rule was subject to any statutory exception. The real
question,71 then, is whether Parliament is to be taken to have intended the
phrase "the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to
law" in s. 2(f) of the Bill to mean "the right to be presumed innocent until
proved guilty according to whatever Parliament enacts from time to time as
law (even if what is enacted as law imposes a duty on an accused to prove,
to some extent or even completely, his innocence)."
The preliminary objection to ascribing to Parliament the identification
in s. 2(f) of the Bill, of "according to law" with "according to whatever
Parliament enacts from time to time as law", is, of course, that it is tantamount to reducing the "right to be presumed innocent" to a quite harmless
and useless platitude.7 2 Apart from the desirability or undesirability of doing
70 Or, if we are to take the interpretation Ritchie, J., seems to have given s.
224A(1) (a), supra, note 57, the conflict lies in providing for conviction where the
essential ingredient of "having entered the vehicle for the purposes of setting it in motion" may not have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. For an accused is only
entitled to acquittal if he proves the absence of this ingredient on a balance of probabilities.
711 say "the real question" because I do not suppose Ritchie, J., to be saying that
Parliament in enacting s. 2(b) of the Bill was thinking specifically of Viscount Sankly's
words in Woolmington, especially since the passage quoted by Ritchie, J. makes no
mention of "the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law".
In fact the closest to this Viscount Sankey, L.C., comes in Woolmington is one passing
use of the phrase "presumption of innocence' in reference to a passage from Taylor on
Evidence l1th ed. (1920), ss. 113: 1935] A.C. 462 at 480.
It is important to note here the context within which Viscount Sankey, Q.C., made his
somewhat cautious statement. His was a jurisdiction in which the legislature had not,
and has not since, sought to impose any limitations on its statute making power, and
thus the complete statement of any point of law would need to include a reference to
previous and possible future legislative abrogations. Our jurisdiction is quite different
in its possession of a Drybones-interpretedBill of Rights.
72 We have long had just such a platitude in Canadian criminal law. S. 5(1) (a)
of the Criminal Code provides:
"5(1) Where an enactment creates an offence and authorizes a punishment to
be imposed in respect thereof;
(a) a person shall be deemed not to be guilty of that offence until he is
convicted thereof, ...
"
The roots of this section are found in An Act Respecting Procedure in Criminal
Cases and Other Matters relating to Criminal Law (1869), 32-33 Vict. c. 29, s. 1(3)
which provided in part:
"Whenever a person doing a certain act is declared to be guilty of any
offence, and to be liable to punishment therefore, it shall be understood that such
person shall only be deemed guilty of such offence and liable to such punishment
after being duly convicted of such act; .. ,"
The former section took over from the latter in S.C. 1953-54, c. 51; the importance
of both sections is indicated by the fact that they haven't found their way into any
reported cases. S. 5(1) (a) is referred to in the "Practice Note' to Guertin (1961), 34
C.R. 345.

19721

Presumption of Innocence

that from the standpoint of criminal law policy, as a matter of statutory construction it would seem to be unsound. For to make any of the rights and
freedoms in the CanadianBill of Rights "subject to any statutory exception"
is to divest them of any purpose, pre-Drybones (as mere "canons on construction") 73 or post-Drybones (as standards by which other statutory provisions might also be rendered inoperative), and it is trite law that the provisions of a statute are to be construed with reference to the purpose of the
whole. 74
However, there are more cogent reasons for believing that Parliament,
in enacting s. 2(f), and indeed many of the substantive provisions of the
Bill of Rights was, to put it in geographical terms, not looking east but rather
south.
What is now s. 2(f) of the Canadian Bill of Rights was not included
when Bill C-60, An Act for the Recognition and Protectionof Human Rights
and FundamentalFreedoms,75 received its first reading in the House of Commons. It was only added after the Special Committee proceedings which
followed the second reading of the Bill (as Bill C-79).76 In describing this addition (which included the addition of both the "presumption of innocence"
and the "reasonable bail" clauses) and a change in the wording of s. 2(b), to
the House of Commons, the Chairman of the Special Committee (Mr.
Spencer) said:
We made three additions to clause 2, and again I emphasize these are not
matters which were not included in the general enumeration of rights and
freedoms in clause 1. Clause 2, after all, is the interpretative clause, and it is
in that clause that an attempt is made to spell out in particular those things to
which the courts must have regard when it comes to the interpretation or the
application of the laws of the Parliament of Canada. 77
73See R. v. Gonzales (1962), 32 D.L.R. (2d) 290 (B.C.C.A.) per Davey, J.A., at
292. Note further that, appearing as it does in s. 2 instead of s. 1, we cannot even
ascribe to it the "declaratory" functions which the rights and freedoms of s. 1 might be
said to have at least in part.
74 See Canada Sugar Refining Co. v. R., [1898] A.C. 735, 741 where Lord Davey
said:
"Every clause of a statute should be construed with reference to the context
and other clauses of the Act, so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes relating to the subject-matter."
See also W. F. Craies, Craes on Statute Law 6th ed. (1963) at 98-100; C. Odgers,
The Construction of Deeds and Statutes 5th ed. (1967) at 237-9; P. Maxwell, The
Interpretation of Statutes 11th ed. (1962) at 66 where the author writes:
"Even where the usual meaning of the language falls short of the whole
object of the legislature, a more extended meaning may be attributed to the
words, if they are fairly susceptible of it ...
If ... there are circumstances in the Act showing that the phraseology is
used in a larger sense than its ordinary meaning, that sense may be given to it;..
75 See (1959), 37 Can. Bar Rev. 1 for a reproduction of Bill C-60.
76 See Tarnapolsky, The CanadianBill of Rights (1966) at 14-17 for the legislative
history of the Bill.
77 Hansard, 1960 at 7405. I am not suggesting, when I quote from Hansard that
such evidence of Parliament's intention is admissible in court. The law is clearly the
other way: A.-G. Can. v. Reader's Digest Assn. (Canada)Ltd., [1961] S.C.R. 775. These
are cogent reasons but they are not legal reasons for interpreting the Bill in the way I
am suggesting.
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After discussing the change in s. 2(b), the Chairman proceeded to s. 2(f):
The other two changes in this clause were made in subclause (f), and again
I say that this was only for the purpose of spelling out in greater detail, without

becoming too verbose, those rights and freedoms declared in the first clause
of the bil.78

The Bill of Rights as ultimately enacted reflects this attitude of the
chairman in its use of the words "and in paricular" in the general part of s. 2
79
to introduce the specific subclauses which follow.
Even the most cursory reading of s. 1 will reveal that the only conceivable "general" of which s. 2(f) could have been intended as a "particular"
was s. 1(a) which reads:
1. It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have existed and
shall continue to exist without discrimination by reason of race, national origin,
colour, religion or sex, the following human rights and fundamental freedoms,
namely,
(a) the right of the individual to life, liberty, security of the person and

enjoyment of property, and the right not to be deprived thereof except by
due process of law; ...

The phrase "due process of law", though long absent from English
jurisprudence by the time Parliament enacted the Canadian Bill of Rights °
actually finds its origin, it is generally agreed, in a statute of Edward In s in
the following context:
That no man of what estate or condition that he be, shall be put out of Land
or Tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to Death,

without being brought to Answer by due Process of the Law.

The phrase appears to have been intended as merely a convertible
restatement of the phrase "the law of the land", as found in the famous
Chapter 39 of Magna Carta which reads:
No free man shall be taken and imprisoned or disseized or exiled or in any way
destroyed, nor will we go upon him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers
and by the law of the land.

The matter is by no means free from doubt, but the better scholarship
seems to have it, that as used in Magna Carta (and thus as restated by the
phrase "due process of the law" 139 years later) "the law of the land" referred not to any old mode of trial then extant and less still to any law
proclaimed by the King no matter how pernicious; rather it referred to "a
traditional body of immemorial custom, 'found' by successive generations
78 Id.

79 This was somewhat more clearly expressed in the Bill as first introduced in

Parliament where the words used were the more common "and without limiting the
generality of the foregoing." The substitution was probably made in response to the

general objections to the original Bill that it was too "legalistic", "dry" and "uninspiring"; see, for example, Mr. Pearson's speech in Hansard, 1960 at 5664.
80 See Tarnapolsky, supra, note 76 at 149; Rand, Except By Due Process of Law
(1961), 2 Osgoode Hall L.J. 171 at 174.
8128 Edw. m, c. 3(1354).
See Mott, Due Process of Law (1926) at 4; Corwin, The Constitution and What It
Means Today, 12th ed. (1958) at 217.
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of suitors in the courts, running back in unbroken continuity to an origin
beyond the Conquest and possibly far beyond ' it", or "the ancient custom
of the realm, 'the law Qf the land' in a real sense."8
Is this not the lex non scripta of Hale8 3 - the common law properly so
called? And is not the common law with respect to the burden of proof in
criminal cases, save where the defence of insanity is raised, that which Viscount Sankey, L.C., laid down in Woolmington, namely proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute guilt?
But surely to reach seven and one half centuries into English legal
history for the meaning in 1960 of the phrase "due process of law" in the
context of a Bill of Rights enacted in Canada is to torture reality. As Mr.
Justice Rand has written:
Not in the history of either Great Britain or Canada has there been such a
formal and specific recognition, declaration and qualification as appears in this
enactment. The phrase is placed for interpretation against the background of
specific liberties; the only analogy we have, and it is an exact one, is its appear84
ance in the setting of American constitutionalism, both federal and state.

Mr. Justice Rand was, of course, referring to the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the American Constitution. The Fifth Amendment8 5 contains
the following words: "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or
property without the process of law". And in the Fourteenth Amendment"
there are the words: "....

nor shall any State deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law". The similarity between
these provisions and subsection (a) of section 1 of the Canadian Bill of
Rights, if a matter of coincidence, is startling.
But it would be absurd to suppose that it is coincidental. The real facts
are otherwise. Much debate and evidence in the proceedings of The Special
Committee on Bill C-79 centered around the phrase "by due process of law"
and it was strongly urged that the phrase should be scrapped and "according
to law" substituted for it. But the inclusion of the former phrase was deliberate.sT As Justice Minister Fulton explained:
It is true that we cannot say that our courts would follow all the American
jurisprudence; but our courts could not fail to take account of the fact that these

words are in the American constitution, that they have been given judicial interpretation.8s

Those are the real facts. The legal facts are that when the CanadianBill
of Rights was enacted, there was not a drop of Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence
82
McIllwain, Due Process of Law in Magna Carta (1914), 14 Col. Law Rev. 26,
44-51. See also, on the meaning of lex terrae, Holdsworth, A History of English Law
4th ed. (1927), Vol. I at 60-62; Jenks, A Short History of English Law 6th ed. (1949)
at 17-19; Hogue, Origins of the Common Law (1966) at 5-6.
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Supra, note 69.
4Rand, supra, note 80 at 174.
85 (1791), applicable to Congress.
86 (1868), applicable to the States.
87 See Tarnapolsky, supra, note 76 at 158.
88
Hansard 1960 at 7431.
8
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as to the meaning of "due process of law" as contrasted with an ocean of
American jurisprudence.
Probably the most litigated clause in the American Constitution, the
due process clause has many areas of uncertainty in its application to American criminal procedure. However, the question which faced the Supreme
Court of Canada in Appleby is not one of them. Had Congress or any of
the State legislatures enacted s. 224A(1) (a) of the Criminal Code, the
Supreme Court of the United States would undoubtedly have struck it down
as violative of due process.
a
In order to understand the American case law in this area, and its
relevance to Canadian law, a short note on classification is necessary.
S.224A(1) (a) of the Criminal
Code is a species of provision known as a
"statutory presumption".8 9 A presumption, as we shall use the term, whether
statutory or otherwise, is a rule of law which gives to a finding of fact or
group of facts (the "basic fact") the effect of shortening inquiry into the presence of another fact or group of facts (the "presumed fact") by declaring
that they shall be "presumed" or "deemed' to be present, once the basic
fact is found to be present.9 0
Presumptions may be either irrebuttable or rebuttable. 91 If irrebuttable,
the legal effect of a finding of the basic fact is to completely foreclose inquiry
into the presence or absence of the presumed fact, which is "conclusively
deemed" to be present. If rebutable, then notwithstanding a finding of the
presence of the basic fact, the presence of the presumed fact may still be
disputed, may be "rebutted". The irrebuttable presumption being more in
the nature of a "definition" where the basic fact equals the presumed fact
in every case, it is not really relevant to a discussion of the allocation of
"persuasive" and "evidential" burdens in a criminal case. Thus we shall
2
concentrate only on rebuttable presumptions. 9
Rebuttable presumptions are either "persuasive" or "evidential", 93 when
used in a criminal law context, according to whether they relieve the prose89 The writing on this area of the law is voluminous. The classic statement is found
in Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law (1898) at 313352; see also Wigmore, Evidence 3rd ed. (1940), Volume 9 at 286-293. Unfortunately
as the courts have not remained completely faithful to these learned authors, we cannot
either; thus the following classification departs seriously in its terminology from these

two works.

00 Presumptions such as the "presumption of innocence" and the "presumption of
sanity", not depending on the preliminary finding of any basic fact are not included
in this classification. Thayer submits that it is "perverse" and "inaccurate" to call "these
maxims and ground principles" presumptions: id., at 335.
91 Both
Thayer, supra, note 84 and Wigmore, supra, note 84 deny that irrebuttable
presumptions are strictly "presumptions" at all. I use the phrase only because it is a
matter of common parlance and convenience.
02 For examples of what I have called "irrebuttable presumptions", see ss. 3,

180(2), and 308 of the Criminal Code.
03 The phraseology is once again that of Glanville Williams, supra, note 15 at

882-886; in McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence (1954), at 639 the terms
"mandatory" and "permissive" are used- to the same effect, but placing more emphasis
on the effect of the presumption on the decision of the trier of fact.
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tion, once the basic fact is found, of its persuasive or evidential burden with
respect to the presumed fact. Thus a persuasive presumption, when not rebuted, in effect proves the presumed fact for the prosecution in the sense that
the trier of fact is required to treat it as proved beyond a reasonable doubt,
i.e. to "find" it. An evidential presumption on the other hand, if not rebutted,
merely operates as prima facie evidence of the presumed fact, protecting
the prosecution from a directed verdict of acquittal on the ground of "no
case to meet" and authorizing the trier of fact to find the presence of the
presumed fact, but in no sense requiringsuch a finding.
Thus, for example, the statutory presumption at issue in Appleby, as it
required a finding of "care or control" ("he shall be deemed"), once it had
been proved that the accused was in the driver's seat at the relevant time
(the basic fact), unless he established that he did not enter for the purpose of
driving (i.e. unless he rebutted the presumption), was a persuasive presumption, because it proved "care or control" for the Crown.9 4
The effect of a rebuttable presumption which has not been rebutted is a
distinct matter from the question of what is necessary to rebut it (render it
inoperative) once raised. Thus a persuasive presumption might cast either a
persuasive burden (as in Appleby, "proof on a balance of probabilities") or
5
an evidential burden on an accused in order to rebut it.0
Both persuasive and evidential presumptions, though obviously helpful
to the Crown, are potentially very dangerous devices, for two distinct but
related reasons. The danger lies in inaccurate factfinding. A persuasive presumption forces the trier of fact, once the basic fact is found, to treat the
presumed fact as having been proved beyond a reasonable doubt - even if
he is not to this extent convinced. And an evidential presumption, in making
out a prima facie case for the Crown in those cases where, on the evidence,
none would otherwise exist, allows an issue to be left with the factfinder,
even though no factfinder properly instructed and acting reasonably could
6
find for the Crown on it.
94
An example of an evidential presumption was s. 293 (2) of the Code before it
was amended by S.C. 1968-69 C. 38 s. 92(2). It provided that on a charge of entering
or being in a dwelling house with intent to commit an indictable offence, evidence that
the accused entered or was in a dwelling house without lawful excuse was "prima facie
evidence that he entered or was in the dwelling house with intent to commit an indictable offence therein". In Austin v. The Queen, [1969] 1 C.C.C. 97, C.R.N.S. 388
(S.C.C.) it was held that this did not relieve the Crown of the duty of proving "intent"
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The amendment, however, substituted for "prima facie evidence" the words "in the
absence of any evidence to the contrary, proof' and this may have changed the presumption from an evidential to a persuasive one; see R. v. Marshall, [1970] 1 C.C.C.
(2d) 505; 13 C.R.N.S. 4 (B.C.C.A.).
95 In Marshall, id., where the Court, seemed to interpret the presumption as being
persuasive (though the point was not in issue), it was held rebutted by the discharge of
an evidential burden only.
961t will be remembered that the only time the prosecution will be "non-suited"
on the ground that it has not made out a prima facie case is where the evidence is such
that no jury properly instructed and acting reasonably could convict; see earlier discussion supra in text accompanying notes 15-30.
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It is with the latter type of danger, the one involved in the use of evidential presumptions, that the American cases have largely been concerned. The
current test by which the constitutionality (as regards due process) of such
presumptions is decided in the United States is found in the opinion of the
Supreme Court in Leary v. United States.97 The charge against Leary was
brought under 21 U.S.C. s. 176a ss. 2(h) which provided (so far as is
relevant): "... whoever, knowingly ...facilitates the transportation ...of
... marijuana after being imported or brought in, knowing the same to have
been imported or brought into the United States contrary to law ...shall
be imprisoned .. .". The subsection went on to provide:
Whenever on trial for a violation of this subsection, the defendant is shown to
have or to have had the marijuana in his possession, such possession shall be
deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant explains
his possession to the satisfaction of the jury.

In declaring this last part unconstitutional as violative of due process, the
Court (in an opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Harlan) enunciated the
following test:
...a criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as "irrational" or "arbitrary" and hence unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said with substantial
assurance that the presumed fact is more98likely than not to follow from the
proved fact on which it is made to depend.

By "at least", the Court meant that it did not feel it necessary to decide
for the purposes of the instant case whether a more stringent test which it
termed "the criminal 'reasonable doubt' standard" had also to be satisfied
because the presumption in Leary failed the less stringent "more likely than
not" test.09
The approach taken by the Court to these presumptions is empirical.
That is, it examines the available data and literature in order to see whether
the presumed fact is more likely than not to follow the proved fact "in common experience". Thus in Leary where two facts necessary to constitute
guilt (viz. foreign origin and knowledge thereof) were "presumed" by the
statute from the mere possession of marijuana, the Court restricted its inquiry to the question of whether it could be said "with substantial assurance
that at least a majority of marijuana possessors have learned of the foreign
origin of their marajuana",100 assuming without deciding that the "foreign
origin" presumption was permissible. The Court found in the negative and
struck down the presumption.
The cardinal thing to be remembered about Leary, of course, is that the
presumption considered there was merely an "evidential" one, and as such
97395 U.S. 6 (1968).
081d., at 36.
Old., at 36, no. 64. Similarly in Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1969),
the Court refrained from deciding this question as it felt that the presumption there
satisfied both tests.
100395 U.S. 6 (1968) at 52.
"In order thus to determine the constitutionality of the "knowledge inference, one
must have direct or circumstantial data regarding the beliefs of marijuana users generally about the source of the drug they consume." Id., at 37-38.
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benefitted the prosecution only in that it relieved it from adducing evidence
directly on the presumed fact, thereby protecting it from a non-suit, and,
perhaps more importantly, it obtained from the trial judge an instruction to
an impressionable jury that in the absence of a satisfactory explanation, proof
of possession was, in the Government's opinion, sufficient evidence upon
which to convict. In cases such as Leary, it is distaste for a statute that
"permits conviction on insufficient proof,"'' that actuates the Court to strike
down the presumptions.
Thus, though it has not yet had to decide the precise question, the
Supreme Court of the United States seems to have "established an identity
between constitutional and judicial standards" of proof; 0 2 and when the
Court refers to a "criminal reasonable doubt" standard it is indicating that
such evidential presumptions will only be allowed to stand if the finding of
the basic fact is enough to make out the traditional prima facie case upon
which the trier of fact might reasonably find the presence of the presumed
fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Such a development might well be considered
inevitable as the Court comes to grips with the confusing inconsistency of
leaving a question of fact with a jury when by definition (viz. by definition of
a traditional prima facie case) no jury acting properly and legally could find
against the accused on the question.
And what of "persuasive" presumptions, such as the one our own
Supreme Court passed upon in Appleby? The U.S. Supreme Court has not
yet been confronted with any such creatures; but its treatment of evidential
presumptions alone should indicate that persuasive presumptions (which
require and do not merely authorize a finding of the presumed fact once the
basic fact has been found) would not stand much of a chance. But the Court
has gone even further. It has stressed the evidential nature of the presumptions
before it, underlining the fact that the trier of fact is not bound to give
effect to them but rather is bound to acquit if left with a reasonable doubt
as to the guilt of the accused, i.e. a reasonable doubt on anything necessary
to constitute the crime charged. 10 3 And, of course, it is the precise function
of the persuasive presumption that it binds the trier of fact, once the basic
fact is found, to "find" the presumed fact, notwithstanding that he may not
be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of its presence.
And it is, of course, the reasonable doubt standard, reflective of the
chill fear of convicting the innocent, which has been lurking behind all these
decisions. In the recent case of In re Winship, 0 - the U.S. Supreme Court
10 Id., at 37 (emphasis added).
102

Comment, The Constitutionality of Statutory Criminal Presumptions (1966),

34 U. Chi. L. Rev. 141 at 151, cited in Leary, id., at 36, n. 64. See also, the Court's
interpretation of its holding in United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965) in Leary at

35: "we sustained the Gainey presumption finding that it did no more than accord to
the evidence, if unexplained, its natural probative force."
103 See Gainey, supra, note 102 at 68-70; Turner, supra, note 99 at 406, n. 6; also

United States v. Adams, 293 F. Supp. 776 (1968) at 783-84, cited in Leary, 36, n. 64.
104 397 U.S. 358 (1970). The case concerned the question of the standard of proof
in juvenile delinquency cases where the juvenile is charged with a violation of the
criminal law.
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finally affirmed the reasonable doubt standard as a requirement of "due
process":
Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. 105
Mr. Justice Brennan, delivering the opinion of the Court, 108 made the
following remarks about the reasonable doubt standard and the administration of criminal justice:
The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has this vital role in
our criminal procedure for cogent reasons. The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty
that he would be stigmatized by the conviction. Accordingly, a society that values
the good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for
commission of a crime when there is a reasonable doubt about his guilt.
Moreover, use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command
the respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law.
It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard
of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned.
It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his
ordinary affairs have confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty
of a criminal offense
without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with
7
utmost certainty.'0

Earlier, the Court had said that the reasonable doubt standard "provides
concrete substance for the presumption of innocence."' 08 This is a fact of
which those who in this country, in England and in the U.S., proudly wave
the presumption of innocence like a banner of freedom are often forgetful.
Yet when Sir James Fitzjames Stephen described the presumption of innocence, he did so only in terms of the prosecution's burden of proving guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. 0 9 Professor Thayer wrote of the presumption:
Very little is said about it before this century ...In looking through the
arguments of Erskine and Curran and other great lawyers famous for their
defence of accused persons and through the charges of the court given to juriesin the last century and the early part of this, we shall find very little, indeed,
almost nothing, about the presumption of innocence. But a great deal will be
found, a very great emphasis is placed, upon the rule that a party must be
proved guilty by a very great weight of evidence. That is the important thing.
And I think it will be found that, in English practice, down to our time, the
presumption of innocence - except as a synonym for the general principle incorporated in that total phrase which expresses the rule about a reasonable
doubt, namely, that the accused must be proved guilty, and that beyond a
reasonable doubt - plays a very small part indeed. (emphasis in original)"O
101Id., at 364.
100 Three judges dissented but only one (Mr. Justice Black) on the question of the
constitutional stature of the reasonable doubt standard.
107397 U.S. 358 (1970) at 363-64.
108 Id., at 363.
109Stephen, A Digest of the Law of Evidence 3rd ed. (1877) at 152-53; see also
Stephen, General View of the Criminal Law of England 2nd ed. (1890) at 183.
"ohayer, supra, note 84, Appendix B at 554. The reader should compare this
statement with the remark of Tysoe, LA., in Silk, supra, note 56, about s.2(f) of the
Bill, that "the key word is 'proved'".
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So when the majority of the Court in Appleby denuded the presumption
of innocence of its "reasonable doubt" support, it rendered it quite impotent.
Of course s. 2(f) of the Bill makes no mention of the reasonable doubt
standard and perhaps a "strict constructionist", literalist or mechanistic view
of the wording of the section 1 1 would justify such an emphasis on the phrase
"according to law". The argument from "due process", of course, could not
be dismissed so easily.
Yet nowhere in the opinion of Ritchie, J., is either the phrase "due
process" or s. 1(a) of the Bill given the slightest mention. The reason is
apparent from the second paragraph of the separate concurring opinion of
Laskin, J., (Hall, J., concurring) where he disclosed:
It was not contended that there was any problem with respect to the "due process
of law" provision of s. l(a) of the Canadian Bill of Rights. Certainly, it cannot
be said that no rational connection exists between the fact to be deemed and
the fact required to be proved: see R. v. Sharpe, [1961] O.W.N. 261, 35 C.R. 375,
131 C.C.C. 75.112

We shall examine the opinion of Laskin, J., in due course, but first we
would do well to pause over this rather cryptic reference to "rational connection" and the Sharpe case.
"Rational connection" or the "rational connection test" is what might
be called the precursor of the "more likely than not" test enunciated in
Leary. It gained prominence in the case of Tot v. United States" 3 where the
minimum test of the constitutionality of criminal statutory presumptions was
expressed as follows:
Under our decisions, a statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there be no
rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, if
the inference of the one from proof of the other is arbitrary because of lack of
connection between the two in common experience.114

The "comparative convenience" test (which asked whether, given the relative
opportunities for knowledge between prosecutor and accused, it would be of
no hardship on the accused to prove the absence of the presumed fact) which
had theretofore been given some currency,115 was relegated to a corollary of
the rational connection test. The two important things to be noted about Tot,
for our purposes, are firstly that the "rational connection" test has clearly
been superseded by the "more likely than not test", and secondly that in Tot
111 The relevant wording of s.2(f) is an exact duplicate of the words in Article
11(1) of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948): "Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved
guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary
for his defence". (emphasis added).
Note the striking difference, for our purposes, between the wording of s.2(f) of the
Bill and this early statement by Mr. Justice Holmes of the constitutional rule against
statutory presumptions in McFarland v. American Sugar Refining Company 241 U.S.
79 (1915) at 86: "it is not within the province of a legislature to declare an individual
guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime."
112 [19711 3 C.C.C. (2d) 354 at 365.
"'s319 U.S. 463 (1943).
"14 Id., at 467.
115 See Morrison v. California291 U.S. 82 (1934).
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the Court, while not perfectly articulating the distinction, was dealing with
what was, and what was treated as, an evidential presumption only, i.e. a
presumption which authorized but did not require conviction once the basic
fact was proved.
In Sharpe, however, the Ontario Court of Appeal was dealing with a
presumption which, though apparently as held, could be rebutted by the discharge of an evidential burden only,"l6 was clearly persuasive, at least on its
face, in the sense that failure to rebut required conviction. 117 After holding
that this did not conflict with s.2(f) of the Bill of Rights, Morden, J.A., made
the following observation:
It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court of the United States has on
many occasions held that statutory presumptions similar to those I have been
considering are not a denial of due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments provided that there is a rational connection in common
experience between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed: Adams v.
New York (1903), 192 U.S. 585; Yee Hem v. United States (1925), 268 U.S.
178; Western & Atlantic Ry. v. Henderson (1929), 279 U.S. 639; Tot v. United
States (1943), 319 U.S. 463; and Cooley; Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed.

(1927) at pp. 639-642.118

All the cases cited in this passage had dealt with presumptions that were
only evidential in character, but Morden, J.A., apparently either did not feel
it necessary to point out this very significant factor, or missed it altogether.
The learned judge might well be forgiven this omission, however, because
9 in
until the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Gainey"1
1965, the significance of the distinction between persuasive and evidential
presumptions for purposes of due process constitutionality had not been made
as clear as it might have been.
However, Gainey, Leary, and Winship, which together clearly spelled
the doom of persuasive presumptions, and cast in severe doubt the constitutionality of evidential presumptions where the proved fact does not of itself
make out the traditional prima facie case (by judicial standards) on the presumed fact, were all decided and reported well in advance of Appleby, and
yet not the slightest mention of any of these cases is found in either of the
opinions rendered by the Supreme Court of Canada. In fact, not one American
case was cited in either the Appellant's factum (which is understandable) or
the Respondent's factum (which is not so understandable).
Let us now return to the brief opinion of Laskin, J. It is a very curious
opinion indeed. Laskin, J. was not as impressed with the phrase "according
to law" in s.2(f) as was Ritchie, J., and he was sensitive to the very intimate
connection between the presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt
standard:
I do not construe s.2(f) as self-defeating because of the phrase "according
to law" which appears therein. Hence, it would be offensive to s.2(f) for a federal
11 6
1

See supra, note 16.

7 See supra, note 13 and note 16.

1s

(1961), 35 C.R. 375 at 378.

110 Supra, note 102.
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criminal enactment to place upon the accused the ultimate burden of establishing
his innocence with respect to any element of the offence charged. The "right to
be presumed innocent", of which s.2(f) speaks, is, in popular terms, a way
of expressing the fact that the Crown has the ultimate burden of establishing
guilt; if there is any reasonable doubt at the conclusion of the case on any
element of the offence charged, an accused person must be acquitted. In a more
refined sense, the presumption of innocence gives an accused the initial benefit of
a right of silence and the ultimate benefit (after the Crown's evidence is in and
as well any evidence tendered on behalf of the accused) of any reasonable doubt:
see Coffin v. U.S. (1895), 156 U.S. 432 at p. 452.120
The next paragraph is a little less clear:
What I have termed the initial benefit of a right of silence may be lost
when evidence is adduced by the Crown which calls for a reply. This does not
mean that the reply must necessarily be by the accused himself. However, if he
alone can make it, he is competent to do so as a witness in his own behalf; and
I see nothing in this that destroys the presumption of innocence. It would be
strange, indeed, if the presumption of innocence was viewed as entitling an
accused to refuse to make any answer to the evidence against him without accepting the consequences in a possible finding of guilt against him. The presumption
does not preclude either any statutory or nonstatutory burden upon an accused
to adduce evidence to neutralize, or counter on a balance of probabilities, the
effect of evidence presented by the Crown. Hence, I do not regard s.2(f) as
addressed to a burden of adducing evidence, arising upon proof of certain facts
by the Crown, even though the result of
a failure to adduce it would entitle the
21
trier of fact to find the accused guilty.1

In this paragraph two very sound points seem to be made, namely that
(1) while an accused has the legal right to "do nothing" to prove
his innocence, since the presumption of innocence may be overcome by proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it may be tactically to his advantage to "do something"; and
(2) neither the presumption of innocence alone, nor in its more completed form, the reasonable doubt standard prevents the imposition
on an accused of a burden of adducing evidence so long as at the
end of the case, if the court has a reasonable doubt as
to whether
22
the accused is guilty, he is entitled to be acquited.1

The disturbing thing about this paragraph is the way in which Laskin, J.,
seems to slur the distinction between the evidential burden, or the burden of

adducing evidence, and the persuasive burden or the burden of proof proper.
120 [19711 3 C.C.C. (2d) 354 at 365. A note of caution with respect to the Coffin
case. Though as authority for the constitutional stature of the presumption of innocence
it is undoubted in American law, the suggestion therein that the presumption of innocence operates "as evidence" in favour of the accused has been uniformly rejected: see
Thayer, supra, at 89, Appendix B.
121 [1971] 3 C.C.C. (2d) 354 at 365.
122 It is precisely to assure that acquittal will be based on only reasonable doubts,
as opposed to merely "conjectural" doubts that an evidential burden-a burden of
adducing "some credible evidence"-may be justifiably imposed. As was pointed out by
Devlin, J., in Hill v. Baxter, [1958] 1 Q.B. 277 at 284;
"It would be quite unreasonable to allow the defence to submit at the end of the
prosecution's case that the Crown had not proved affirmatively and beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was at the time of the crime sober, or not sleep walking or not in a trance or blackout."
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To repeat: "The presumption does not preclude either any statutory or nonstatutory burden upon an accused to adduce evidence to neutralize,or counter
on a balance of probabilities,the effect of evidence presented by the Crown."
(emphasis added)
This confusion between the evidential burden and the persuasive burden
prepares us for Mr. Justice Laskin's otherwise startling and somewhat terse
conclusion in the next paragraph:
In my opinion, the test for the invocation of s.2(f) is whether the enactment
against which it is measured calls for a finding of guilt of the accused when,
at the conclusion of the case, and upon the evidence, if any, adduced by Crown
and by accused, who have also satisfied any intermediate burden of adducing
evidence, there is123a reasonable doubt of culpability. Section 224A(1) (a) is not
of this character.

With the greatest respect, to characterize a burden of proving the truth
of a matter by a preponderance of the evidence or on a balance of probabilities as a "burden of adducing evidence" is to confound a quite elemental
distinction, 2 4 and it makes no difference whether one calls the burden "intermediate", "ultimate" or "primordial".
Appleby adduced evidence (testimony) and the evidence raised a
reasonable doubt in the trial judge's mind as to whether Appleby had entered
the car for the purpose of setting it in motion. If one regards "intention to
drive" as an essential ingredient of the offence created by s. 222 of the Code
(as Ritchie, I., seems to have regarded it),125 then a reasonable doubt as to
this ingredient is a reasonable doubt as to "culpability". If s. 224A(1) (a)
provided for conviction on this state of affairs, then according to Mr. Justice
Laskin's own formulation of the meaning of s. 2(f) of the Bill, there was
a clear conflict between the two provisions. But even if "intention to drive"
is not regarded as an essential ingredient of the offence created by s.222,126
since s. 224A(1) (a) requires a court to find guilt notwithstanding the presence of a reasonable doubt as to "care or control" (just so long as the accused was found impaired in the driver's seat and does not "establish" a
lack of intention to drive), then again, according to Mr. Justice Laskin's
formulation of the meaning of s. 2(f) of the Bill, s. 224A(l) (a) was
"offensive" to it.
The final paragraph of the opinion of Laskin, J., which he included
by way of observation only, perhaps indicates how he really viewed
s.224A(1) (a):
I may observe that what is true of s.224A(l) (a) is also true of the insanity
provisions of the Criminal Code. The presumption of sanity, expressed in
s. 16(4) [now s.16(4), R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34], may be overcome by the accused
on a balance of probabilities: see R. v. Borg, [1969] 4 C.C.C. 262, 6 D.L.R.
(3d) 1, [19691 S.C.R. 551. I note that it has been held by the Supreme Court
of the United States that the due process clause of its Constitution is not offended
by a state requirement that an accused prove the defence of insanity beyond a
123 [1971] 3 C.C.C. (2d) 354 at 365-6.

12 4 See Jayasena, supra, note 23.
125 See supra, note 57.
126 See Donald, supra, note 57.
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reasonable doubt: see Leland v. Oregon (1952), 343 U.S.
1970. That is not an
127
issue which arises under our formulation of the law.

Is there any analogy between s. 224A(1) (a) and the defence of insanity? I submit there is not. To view s.224(1) (a) as creating a defence,
would require viewing it as also altering the nature of the offence created by
s. 222. One would have to say that the offence of care or control of a vehicle
while impaired is not really the offence at all; rather it is being found in the
driver'sseat while impaired which is really the offence - an offence to which
one might plead the defence of not having entered for the purpose of setting
the vehicle in motion. But to say this is surely to destroy the plain structure
and wording of the two sections. The offence and its elements are found in
s. 222, and a method of proving it is all that is provided by s.224A(1) (a).
It would be destructive of the principle of legality to allow a legislature to
purport to create an offence in one section and to punish a person, not for
having violated that section, but for having done something into which,
through the use of what for all intents and purposes looks like a procedural
section, the first offence has been surreptitiously reconstituted.
But what about defences properly and openly created? Are they to be
treated any differently? In other words, is it permissible under the Canadian
Bill of Rights for Parliament to abandon the somewhat suspect device of a
statutory presumption in favour of an offence - defence structure where the
new offence is what is now the basic fact and the new defence is the absence
of what is now the presumed fact - with the proviso that the defence must
be proved by a balance of probabilities?
I suppose that the defence of insanity is the best place to start to answer
this question as it is the only common law defence for which the persuasive
burden is on the accused. For all the others the accused is charged with only
an evidential burden which, once discharged,
leaves the Crown with a burden
28
of disproof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Laskin, I., cited the case of Leland v. Oregon in which the Supreme
Court of the United States held that the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment (applicable to the States) did not prohibit an Oregon statute 29
from imposing on an accused alleging insanity a burden of proving it beyond
a reasonable doubt. 3 0 Leland, however, occupies a peculiar temporal position
in American constitutional law and in the light of Winship'8 ' is of very
doubtful authority for the following reasons.
[1971] 3 C.C.C. (2d) 354 at 366.
12 8 See Glanville Williams, supra, note 15 at 885-86, 909-910.
129 Ore. Comp. Laws, 1940, s. 26-929.
130 Oregon has since lessened this requirement to proof on "a preponderance of the
evidence": Ore. Rev. Stat., s. 136-390 (1963); in 1967 half the States imposed this persuasive burden on the accused while the other half imposed only an evidential burden
on the accused, leaving it to the prosecution once the issue had been sufficiently raised,
to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt: Goldstein, The Insanity Defence (1967),
at 111-12.
3-lsSupra, note 104.
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In the case of Davis v. United Statesa32 an accused charged with murder
pleaded insanity as a defence. The trial judge instructed the jury that it was
their duty to convict when the evidence was equally balanced regarding the
sanity of the accused, i.e. unless he had proved his sanity on a balance of
probabilities or by a preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court of
the United States reversed the conviction, holding that the value of the presumption of sanity was completely preserved by casting a burden "to produce
some evidence"' 133 (what we have called an evidential burden) on the
accused, thus relieving the prosecution from adducing affirmative evidence of
the accused's sanity in every case, but that it would violate the presumption
of innocence to convict an accused, unless the prosecution had proved sanity
beyond a reasonable doubt once the issue had been raised sufficiently (by the
production of "some evidence") to require instruction to the jury. In the
words of Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court:
If the whole evidence, including that supplied by the presumption of sanity,
does not exclude beyond reasonable doubt the hypothesis of insanity, of which
some proof is adduced, the accused is entitled to an acquittal of the specific

offence charged. His guilt cannot be said to have been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt - his will and his acts cannot be held to have joined in perpetrating the
murder charged - if the jury, upon all the evidence, have a reasonable doubt
whether he was legally capable of commiting crime, or (which is the same thing)
whether he wilfully, deliberately, unlawfully, and of malice aforethought took
the life of the deceased. As the crime of murder involves sufficient capacity to
distinguish between right and wrong, the legal interpretation of every verdict
of guilty ais charged is that the jury believed from all the evidence beyond a

reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty, and was therefore responsible,
criminally, for his acts. How then upon principle or consistently with humanity
can a verdict of guilty be properly returned, if the jury entertain a reasonable
doubt as to the existence of a fact which is essential to guilt, namely, the capacity

in law of the accused to commit that crime?' 3 4

The Court further stated that the requirement of proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt was a principle "fundamental in criminal law, ... the
recognition and enforcement of which [is] ... demanded by every consideration of humanity and justice."' 3 5
Nevertheless, when Leland came to be decided fifty-seven years later,
Davis was distinguished on the ground that, being concerned with a federal
prosecution, it had not purported to establish a constitutional rule upon the
States. In fact the reluctance of the Supreme Court to use the Fourteenth
Amendment to impose uniform standards of criminal responsibility on the
States had its role to play in Leland (per Mr. Justice Clark):
... choice of a test of legal sanity involves not only scientific knowledge but

182 160 U.S. 469 (1895).

188 Id., at 486.
' 34 Id.,

at 488.

185 Id., at 493.
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questions of basic policy as to the extent to which that knowledge should determine criminal responsibility.'3 6

Since "due process" had not been specifically in issue in Davis, the
Court in Leland felt free to consider the matter freshly. On investigation, the
Court found that in England and in twenty States the accused was required
to prove his insanity on a balance of probabilities and felt that the difference
between this and proof beyond a reasonable doubt was merely a matter of
degree:
While there is an evident distinction between these two rules as to the quantum
of proof required, we see no practical difference of such magnitude as to be
significant in determining the constitutional
question we face here. Oregon merely
13 7
requires a heavier burden of proof.

Tot 38 was distinguished substantially on the ground that the issue of "ele13 9
ments of the offence" was separate and distinct from "defences".
Notwithstanding all this, eighteen years after Leland, in Winship, the
constitutional standard of proof was described as proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact - not "element" - necessary to constitute guilt.140
Davis was cited and quoted in support of the constitutional standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt as was the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in Leland.141 While the Court in Winship did not directly overrule Leland, the case has justifiably been interpreted as having had, in effect,
14
this result.
But American techniques of precedent erosion and circumvention do not
concern us here. What is of concern is whether the burden of proof anomaly
of the insanity defence is a justifiable anomaly. Certainly the fact that it was
meet to the learned judges in M'Naughten's Case 4 3 to so lay down the rule
is no reason why we should not re-examine it. As Mr. Justice Holmes once
noted, "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so
'
it was laid down in the time of Henry V."'
And what "better reason"
have we for imposing a burden of proof on a balance of probabilities on an
accused pleading insanity? Any useful purpose of the "presumption of
sanity" is served by casting on such an accused the evidential burden that
136 343 U.S. 790 (1952) at 801.
This issue, which arises under the American division of jurisdiction over criminal
law, but which is obviously not relevant to Canada, can be seen to concern the Supreme
Court in other areas of criminal law; see, for example Powell v. State of Texas 392
U.S. 514 (1968).
137 343 U.S. 790 (1952)
at 798.
1sSupra, note 113.
139 343 U.S. 790 (1952) at 797.
140 See supra, note 105.
'41 397 U.S. 358 (1970) at 361-62.
142 See United States v. Eichberg, 439 F2d 620 (D.C. Cir. 1971) at 623-24, per
Bazelon, CJ.
143 Supra, note 65.
144 O.W. Holmes, The Path of Law (1897), 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 at 469.
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he bears with respect to all other defences. 45 However, once we say that
we are willing to convict an accused notwithstanding the presence of a reasonable doubt as to whether he was insane or not at the time he committed
the offence, we indicate an ambivalence about the defence of insanity. 14 We
are saying, in effect, that an accused who acted out of insanity is "less innocent" than one who acted out of self-defence, because we are evincing a
greater concern for protecting those who are "innocent" because of the latter
excuse, than those who are "innocent" because of the former.
However, unless "innocence" is to lose all legal and moral meaning, we
must be equally cautious of not convicting those who are innocent for any
reason. Certainly, s.2(f) of the CanadianBill of Rights makes no distinction
between degrees of innocence; and if, as it is submitted, the presumption of
innocence is meaningless unless coupled with the reasonable doubt standard,
that standard must equally apply to the insanity defence. The only alternative
is to stop making pretence and adopt the usage abandoned by the English in
1964, namely a verdict of "guilty but insane' 47 instead of the present "not
guilty on account of insanity".
145 In Davis, supra, note 132 at 486-7 having held the reasonable doubt standard
applicable to the defence of insanity, the Court discussed the "presumption of sanity"
as follows:
This view is not at all inconsistent with the presumption which the law,
justified by the general experience of mankind as well as by considerations of
public safety, indulges in favor of sanity. If that presumption were not indulged
the government would always be under the necessity of adducing affirmative
evidence of the sanity of an accused. But a requirement of that character would
seriously delay and embarrass the enforcement of the laws against crime, and in
most cases be unnecessary. Consequently the law presumes that every one charged
with crime is sane, and thus supplies in the first instance the required proof of
capacity to commit crime. It authorizes the jury to assume at the outset that the
accused is criminally responsible for his acts ....
...In a certain sense it may be true that where the defence is insanity, and
where the case made by the prosecution discloses nothing whatever in excuse or
extenuation of the brime charged, the accused is bound to produce some evidence
that will impair or weaken the force of the legal presumption in favor of sanity.

But to hold that such presumption must absolutely control the jury until it is overthrown or impaired by evidence sufficient to establish the fact of insanity beyond
all reasonable doubt or to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury, is in effect to
require him to establish his innocence, by proving that he is not guilty of the
crime charged.
146 In The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (1968), Professor Packer writes at 139:
139:
"Excuses about which we are peculiarly ambivalent, such as the insanity
defense, are often left to the defendant to prove. And recognition of a novel
defense like mistake of law is only transitionally achieved by allowing the defense
to be presented while requiring the defendant to carry the burden of proving it,
or by setting a less severe standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt for the
prosecution's negation of the defense. But these devices are compromises with the
principle of culpability, compromises that will not endure. The more clearly we
see the requirements that the peculiar character of the criminal sanction lays
upon us, the less willing we will be to permit this kind of temporizing with basic
principle. Recent legislative revisions of the criminal law attest to the predictive
truth of this observation."
See also Cross and Jones, An Introduction to Criminal Law (1968) at 73.
147
See the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act, 1964 (U.K.) s. 1.
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The same considerations, of course, are applicable to all excuses and
justifications which are recognized by the law, And it should hardly matter
whether such excuses or justifications are enacted in the form of "defences",
"exceptions", "exemptions", "provisos", "qualifications" or whatever. 148
For example, it cannot be seriously disputed that an accused is just as
innocent of the offence of "without lawful excuse... [having] in his possession any instrument for house-breaking"1 49 if he possessed such an instrument
but had a lawful excuse, as if he possessed no such instrument at all. Yet, as
the law stands, if there is a reasonable doubt as to whether or not he possessed such an instrument, he is to be acquitted; if there is no doubt as to
possession but a reasonable doubt (only) as to whether or not he had a
lawful excuse, he is to be convicted. 150 Is there any justification in principle or
in policy for the distinction? Why are we less concerned about protecting the
liberty and good name of one "innocent" than we are about the other "innocent"?
The reason, as with many other criminal law anomalies, seems to be
largely historical. It was the tendency of the common law judges to decide
questions involving the allocation of burdens of proof in criminal cases by
analogizing with the rules that prevailed in private law disputes. As Professor
Fletcher has written:
The courts required little authority for their decisions; for the results seemed
in keeping with an intuitively plausible way to structure criminal litigation. And
the plausibility of that system traded on the assimilation of the criminal process
to the model set by the litigation of private disputes. It seemed natural, in criminal
as well as private cases, that certain issues should be the responsibility of the
defendant or his lawyer. The resulting division of the criminal case - into inculpatory and exculpatory issues - called forth incomplete rules of criminal liability:
like rules of private law, they were silent on the defensive issues. As a man
would be liable in an action on the case for negligently and proximately causing
harm to another (no mention of assumption of risk), so would he be liable criminally for intentionally and maliciously killing another human being (no mention of self-defense and insanity).151

Borrowing from such maxims of private law as ei incumbit probatio qui dicit;
non qui negat152 and reus excipiendo fit actor,153 maxims which stretched
back to the great logical system of Roman law, the criminal law came to
regard matters of exception generally as "appropriate" for the accused to
prove, whether found within or without these "incomplete rules". The ten14 8 The list is derived from s. 730 of the Criminal Code where the "burden of

proving" that such matters operate in the defendant's favour is placed on him, with
respect to summary conviction offences. For the history of the section, see Levy, supra,
note 28 at 45, n. 24.
149 S.309(1) of the Criminal Code, quoted supra, note 8.
160 See remarks of Hall, J., as to the dangers involved in this state of affairs in
Tupper v. The Queen [1968] 1 CC.C. 253 at 257-58.
151 Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion Practices in Criminal Cases (1968), 77 Yale L. J. 880 at 907. The following
discussion draws heavily on this superb article.
152 '"heproof lies upon him who affirms, not upon him who denies."
153 'The defendant, by excepting or pleading, becomes a plaintiff."
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dency, as we have seen, has largely ended with respect to the "common law
defences"' 5 4 (save for that of insanity), but much is still made, for purposes
of allocating persuasive burdens of the distinctions between positive and negative "averments", "elements" and "exceptions", etc.155
The issue arises in our possession of house-breaking instruments without
lawful excuse example in the following way. The accused could have any one
of a multitude of lawful excuses for being in possesion of a house-breaking
instrument. If he does have one, though, it is very probable that he knows
what it is or at least can point to it. On the other hand, for the Crown to
make out a prima facie case by adducing evidence on the absence of all
possible lawful excuses, let alone to prove their absence beyond a reasonable
doubt, would be exceedingly difficult if not impossible. The common law
judges solved this dilemma by reaching into private law for the rule that "if
a negative averment be made by one party, which is peculiarly within the
knowledge of the other, the party within whose knowledge it lies, and who
asserts the affirmative is to prove it, and not he who avers the negative".15 6
Of course, the rule, being of private law origin, did not distinguish between
the persuasive and evidential burdens (essentially a recent criminal law distinction), nor was it necessary to make this distinction given the fact that the
characteristic situation in which the question arose was a submission by the
accused that the Crown had failed to make out a prima facie case. 157 Further154 Eg. self-defence, necessity, duress.

155 The following is a breakdown into what might be called "traditional" categories
of the instances in the Criminal Code in which a persuasive burden of proof (on a
balance of probabilities) is placed on the accused, thus providing for conviction notwithstanding a reasonable doubt as to guilt or innocence:
(1) negative averments peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused
("without lawful excuse, the proof of which lies upon him" etc.): ss. 58(3);
80; 102(3); 106(1); 114(C); 133(1) (b), (2), (3), (4), (5); 173; 197(2);
247(2); 258(a); 307(1); 309(1); 310; 327; 334(b), (c); 341(2); 363;
375(1) (a), (2); 377; 396; 408; 409; 410; 416; 417; 457.2(2).
(2) exceptions found outside the enacting clause, or "defences" ("No accused shall be convicted of an offence under section ... where he proves that ..."
etc.): ss. 139(2); 159(3); 243(2); 247(3); 253(2); 275; 280(2); 281.2(3);
360(2); 367(2); 378(2); 386(2); 415(3).

(3) positive averments or "elements" in which the burden is cast on the ac-

cused through the use of persuasive presumptions ("he shall be deemed ...unless he estalishes that .. ." etc.): ss. 16(4); 193(4); 237(1) (a); 254(4); 267(1);
320(4) (semble); 450(3); 452(3); 453(3); 454(4).
(4) exceptions found within the enacting clause ("unless he establishes that
." etc.): ss. 50(1) (a); 94; 110(1) (b), (c); 352(1) (c).
(5) positive averments or "elements" in which the burden iscase on the
accused without the use of persuasive presumptions: as. 139(3); 179(3); 299(5).
(6) general section casting persuasive burden on accused with respect to all
exceptions in summary conviction matters: s. 730(2).
IGOR. v. Turner (1816), 5 M. & S. 206 at 211; 105 E.R. 1026 at 1028, per
Bayley, J.
5
1 7See R. v. Scott (1921), 85 J.P. 69; R. v. Oliver, [1944] K.R. 68 (C.C.A.); R.
v. Ewens, [1967] 1 Q.B. 322 (C.C.A.)
In each of these cases, as in Turner, the only question was whether the prosecution had made out a prima facie case without having adduced evidence on the element
negatively averted. But in each there is dicta indicating that the persuasive burden also
shifts.
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more, it is abundantly clear that the dilemma could have been, and still can
be, solved for all purposes by imposing on an accused merely the same evidential burden he presently bears with respect to such defences as selfdefence. In order to avoid foreclosure of the issue of "lawful excuse" against
him, 15s he would have to point to "some evidence" upon which a reasonable
doubt as to whether or not he had a lawful excuse could be properly founded.
The Crown would thus be relieved of making out a prima facie case on the
issue of lawful excuse until the accused discharged his evidential burden with
respect to that issue. Naturally, the adduction of evidence by the accused
would narrow down the infinite number of possible excuses to the particular
one upon which he was relying. To prove the absence of this particular lawful
excuse beyond a reasonable doubt would be no more difficult for the Crown
than the satisfaction of59the same requirement with respect to "elements" and
"defences" generally.
There seems, therefore, no justification in policy (unless the policy is
that of giving less protection to one kind of "innocent" than to another) or
in principle (unless the principle is that of maintaining a pleasing consistency
between criminal and private law procedure) for Parliament's habit, in this
type of case, of shifting the persuasive burden as well as the evidential burden
to the accused. There is never such justification in any type of case. 60 A shift
in the evidential burden only would always be sufficient, as well as being the
only kind of shift consistent with the desiderata of the reasonable doubt
standard, the presumption of innocence and due process of law.,6,
Postscript:"The Americans Are Coming!"
In the course of this discussion, the reader has no doubt noted (perhaps
with some unease) a thoroughly un-Canadian emphasis on American authori158 Whether the issue should be foreclosed against the accused, or whether a failure

on the accused's part to discharge his evidential burden should merely authorize the
court to find against him is a question that really only arises in a jury trial. The
qjuestion is whether it is desirable for the judge in some circumstances to be able to
remove the issue from the jury's consideration, or whether the jury should always have
the opportunity to consider it. It is a matter of jury control.
59 See Glanville Williams, supra, note 15 at 901-905 to the same effect.
160 Strangely enough, Professor Levy, who is sensitive to the private law origins of
the confusion in this area and (presumably) to the totally disparate policy purposes of
allocations of burdens of persuasion in private law and criminal law, is nevertheless of
the opinion that the CanadianBill of Rights "still allows negative averments and matters
arising by way of confession and avoidance, other than affirmative defences at common
law, to be the objects of a reverse onus clause casting the civil burden on the accused":
Levy, supra, note 28 at 58. The only policy justifications he can offer, however, are
the ones just discussed which we have shown are satisfied by a shift in the evidential
burden only. (see p. 62). See also the distinction made on this ground by Tysoe, J.A.,
in R. v. Silk, [19701 3 C.C.C. 1 at 7-8 and 13-15.
161 This is not, of course, to say that a shift in the evidential burden would
always be consistent with these principles, even with respect to matters of "exception".
There will always be a question as to whether a shift in the evidential burden is legitimate and the answer will involve not only considerations of the presumption of innocence, but also of "self-crimination" and "probable cause". My thesis is simply that it
is only with respect to a shift in the evidential burden that a legitimate question can
ever arise. A shift in the persuasive burden, because it allows conviction when there is a
reasonable doubt of guilt is never legitimate.
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ties to aid in the interpretation of a Canadian statute. I have not, of course,
intended to suggest that our judges should be bound by American decisions
nor even that they should recognize them as "authoritative" in any strict legal
sense. What I am suggesting is simply that in using a phrase such as "due
process of law" in the context of a "Bill of Rights" enacted in 1960, in full
knowledge of the treatment being given that phrase, by then peculiar to American courts, Parliament was saying something quite explicit to our judges. At
the very least, it was telling them to exercise the same sort of careful watchfulness over federal legislation as the American judges in administering their
Bill of Rights exercise over American legislation. As Mr. Justice Rand has
eloquently written of the due process clause in the Canadian Bill of Rights:
Why not, then, leave the question of what is fair and acceptable to the
determination of legislatures? Whatever the answer to this, the legislature, by its
own declaration, has placed the duty on the courts which they must accept; and
by doing so, it has recognized that on occasion legislation does not always restrain its action within the limits of due process. It has accepted the view that
under the conditions in which laws are enacted in our parliamentary system
there may be lapses from those appreciations of inarticulate interests with which
the function of courts is specifically and uniquely charged; that a detached and
objective examination in an atmosphere from which certainly a wider range of
irrelevance is excluded than in a legislature will probably be able to pronounce
a sounder judgment than that of public debate. Parliament in fact has expressed
its opinion to that effect in conditioning legislation by due process; and it has
presented to judicial tribunals for the first time an opportunity to elaborate a
Canadian jurisprudence
within the perspective of the national ethos of a modem
10 2

western state.
The task thus assigned is doubtless a difficult one. But in packing the
Canadian Bill of Rights with phrases which, though necessarily vague and
imprecise, have been the object of almost two hundred years of passionate
debate among the very learned and vigorous members of the American legal
profession, Parliament intended to give our courts a good deal of aid. It is
now for our courts and our lawyers to make use of the tool thus provided,
by reading what has been written, listening to what has been said, and- watching what has been happening around and about the words in the American
Bill of Rights.
There is, of course, the further happy aspect that our Bill of Rights is
free of many of the more obvious pitfalls of its American counterpart. While
an American contemplating the activities of his Supreme Court might become
"convinced that his welfare and liberty were ultimately at the mercy of a selfconceived super-legislature instead of a court of law,"' 63 and might denounce
the Court as an undemocratic straightjacket on the general will as expressed
in legislation, given the fact that unrestrained judicial elaboration of the
American Bill of Rights may well have far outstripped the modest intendments of the framers of that ancient document and given the near impossibility of changing its now sacred words, 6 4 a Canadian could make no such

162 Rand, supra,note 80 at 190.
163 Bischoff, 'The Role of Official Precedents", in Cahn, Supreme Court and Su-

preme Law (1954) at 78.
104 For a careful examination of some current arguments against judicial review of
American legislation under the Constitution, see Berger, Congress v. The Supreme Court
(1969) at 154-197.
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complaints, should the Supreme Court of Canada start applying the Canadian
Bill of Rights. For notwithstanding any violence the American courts may be
said to have done, at least in approach, to the intentions of the framers of the
American Bill of Rights, Parliament was fully aware of this when it enacted
ours in 1960, and using the type of language it used, it obviously desired
that approach. The only way our courts could now be said to set themselves
up above the legislature is to refuse its clear direction to adopt that approach.
As an American judge once put it, "the demolition of the purpose of Congress, through stingy interpretation, is the most emphatic kind of judicial
legislation". 165
Furthermore, a decision by the Supreme Court of Canada under the
CanadianBill of Rights which is adverse to a federal legislative effort is not,
as it may be in the United States, the end of the matter. It is not that the
Bill is easy to amend - politically that may be a very difficult thing to do.
Rather, Parliament has provided itself with a safety valve (indeed, it could
not be otherwise with a non-constitutional Bill of Rights). If it decides,
165 Judge Frank, dissenting in M. Witmark & Sons v. Fred Fisher Music Co., 125
F. 2d 949 (1942) at 967.

It is curious, therefore, to hear apologists of the Supreme Court of Canada's

treatment of the CanadianBill of Rights say things such as "... it is useless to expect
Canadian courts to fashion any viable civil liberties jurisprudence at the present time.
Concepts of Legislature Supremacy ... will continue to plague this area of the law".
(emphasis added): Barton, The Power of the Crown to Proceed by Indictment or
Summary Conviction (1971), 14 Crim. LQ. 86 at 101. Reference should here be made
to the case of R. v. Nevin, R. v. De Poe (1971), 16 C.R.N.S. 315 (Ont. CA.) in
which the argument that the deprivation of trial by jury in s. 467 (now 483) of the
Criminal Code where the offence charged was an indictable offence, conflicted with the
due process clause in s.l(a) of the Canadian Bill of Rights was rejected and leave to
appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was refused without written reasons (Feb. 1,

1971).

The Court distinguished Duncan v. Louisiana (1968), 391 U.S. 145, which had
held that the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment gave an accused a right
to a jury trial with respect to all but petty offences, on the correct ground that the basis
of that holding was not the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment (from which
derives the reasonable doubt standard and the presumption of innocence) but rather
the specific guarantee of trial by jury "in all criminal prosecutions" in the Sixth Amendment. However, instead of then proceeding to a discussion of the policy considerations
involved (which it mentioned only incidentally) the Court declared that the Canadian
Bill of Rights was "simply another statute" and as such had to be construed as of the
date of its passage. Since, when the Bill was passed, the denial of trial by jury in certain
cases was part of our administration of justice, reasoned the Court, it had to be taken
as "recognized" as being included in "due process of law".
Besides the fact that it might become increasingly difficult and ludicrous in future
years to refer back to the magic date of August 10, 1960 to discover the state of the
law, this was a position clearly rejected in Drybones where the impugned provision of
the Indian Act was similarly argued to have been included in what was meant as
"equality before the law" in 1960. More important, for our purposes, is the justification
given by the Court of Appeal for its mechanistic approach to the Bill. After discussing
the Duncan case, it said (per Jessup, J.A., at p. 320): "Moreover, the Court was there
construing a constitutional document where broad principles of construction affected by
policy may be permissible, and the Court was discharging a quasi-legislative function

permitted to it but denied to this Court."

Denied by whom? Certainly not by Parliament. And which is more "legislative"-compliance or non-compliance with an obvious Parliamentary command?
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after the careful consideration one would expect in matters such as these,
that it desires to maintain a provision which the Supreme Court has declared
is rendered inoperative by the Bill, it can do so by declaring that "this provision shall operate notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights". The important thing is that Parliament has recognized and declared certain "human
rights and fundamental freedoms" to exist in Canada and it has entrusted to
the courts the duty of making it honour that statement. Any departures must
be specially justified and then honestly and prominently marked as such.
Otherwise the Canadian Bill of Rights is less than pious platitude. It is pious
hypocrisy.
It has been suggested that it is unfair to burden our judges with such a
"policy" oriented task as is involved in the administration of a Bill of Rights,
educated as they are said to be in "the traditions of positivism."'16 6 By "positivism" is meant, I suppose, a mechanistic or mechanical jurisprudence of
neat rules and categories. I doubt whether anybody really believe that such
rules or categories are anywhere to be found - certainly they aren't to be
found in a common law jurisdiction. Judges are legislating (consciously or
unconsciously) all the time.167 A Bill of Rights just forces them to think
about it more carefully and openly. It liberates them from having to disguise
a crucial issue such as the burden of proof in criminal cases by dressing it
up in some illusive category of private law pleading semantics, and allows
them to consider it as it exists in reality, in the context of the whole adminis68
tration of criminal justice.'
Perhaps the final argument that could be offered against this "activist"
approach to the Canadian Bill of Rights that I am advocating, is that, in
these days of fervent cultural nationalism, it smacks of "Americanization".
This is on the same level of ludicrousness as the Nazis' rejection of Einsteinian physics as "Jewish physics."' x6 9 It is, of course, the mark of the wise man
that he can discriminate clearly enough to select what is worthwhile and
reject what is not from any given package. We have many more alternatives
than either wholly accepting or wholly rejecting American jurisprudence in
this area. We need neither follow judiciously behind the Americans 70 nor
try to keep pace with them nor try to outrace them. If we are wise, we need
only listen to what they have to say.
166 The suggestion is made in Sinclair, The Queen v. Drybones: The Supreme Court
of Canada and The Canadian Bill of Rights (1970), 8 Osgoode Hall LJ. 599 at 608.
16 7
See Stone, Legal System and Lawyers' Reasonings (1964) at 229-300; also
Montrose, Precedent in English Law (1968) at 100-101.
108 See, for example, the discussion of the function of the reasonable doubt standard
by Mr. Justice Brennan in Winship, supra, note 107.
160 See Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (1960) at 251.
170 For example, the Supreme Court of Canada in Drybones skipped over the fiftyseven year period in American constitutional history between Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896) and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1953), during which
the "separate but equal" doctrine had had currency. It was through reference to the
American experience that the Court could recognize the functionally bankrupt nature
of this interpretation of "equality before the law" which had been given by Tysoe, J.A.,
in Gonzales, supra n. 73; see the opinion of Hall, I., in The Queen v. Drybones, [19701
S.C.R. 282 at 299.

